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THE EROSION OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN
THE UNITED STATES TODAY
Richard H. Kohn
In over thirty-five years as a military historian, I have come to have great re-spect for and trust in American military officers. The United States is truly
blessed to have men and women of the highest character leading its youth and
safeguarding its security. That fact makes the present subject all the more trou-
bling and unpleasant, whether to write or read about it. However, the subject is
crucial to the nation’s security and to its survival as a republic. I am speaking of a
tear in the nation’s civil and political fabric; my hope is that by bringing it to the
attention of a wide military and defense readership I can prompt a frank, open
discussion that could, by raising the awareness of the American public and alert-
ing the armed forces, set in motion a process of healing.
My subject is the civil-military relationship at the pinnacle of the govern-
ment, and my fear, baldly stated, is that in recent years civilian control of the
military has weakened in the United States and is threatened today. The issue
is not the nightmare of a coup d’état but rather the evidence that the Ameri-
can military has grown in influence to the point of being able to impose its
own perspective on many policies and decisions. What I have detected is no
conspiracy but repeated efforts on the part of the armed forces to frustrate or
evade civilian authority when that opposition seems likely to preclude out-
comes the military dislikes.
While I do not see any crisis, I am convinced that civilian control has dimin-
ished to the point where it could alter the character of American government
and undermine national defense. My views result from nearly four decades of
reading and reflection about civilian control in this country; from personal ob-
servation from inside the Pentagon during the 1980s; and since then, from
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watching the Clinton and two Bush administrations struggle to balance national
security with domestic political realities.
Understanding the problem begins with a review of the state of civil-military re-
lations during the last nine years, a state of affairs that in my judgment has been
extraordinarily poor, in many respects as low as in any period of American
peacetime history. No president was ever as reviled by the professional mili-
tary—treated with such disrespect, or viewed with such contempt—as Bill
Clinton. Conversely, no administration ever treated the military with more fear
and deference on the one hand, and indifference and neglect on the other, as the
Clinton administration.
The relationship began on a sour note during the 1992 campaign. As a youth,
Clinton had avoided the draft, written a letter expressing “loathing” for the mili-
tary, and demonstrated against the Vietnam War while in Britain on a Rhodes
scholarship. Relations turned venomous with the awful controversy over gays in
the military, when the administration—in ignorance and arrogance—announced
its intention to abolish the ban on open homosexual service immediately, without
study or consultation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded by resisting, floating ru-
mors of their own and dozens of other resignations, encouraging their retired
brethren to arouse congressional and public opposition, and then more or less
openly negotiating a compromise with their commander in chief.1
The newly elected president was publicly insulted by service people (includ-
ing a two-star general) in person, in print, and in speeches. So ugly was the behav-
ior that commanders had to remind their subordinates of their constitutional and
legal obligations not to speak derogatorily of the civilian leadership; the Air Force
chief of staff felt obliged to remind his senior commanders “about core values,
including the principle of a chain of command that runs from the president
right down to our newest airman.”2
Nothing like this had ever occurred in American history. This was the most
open manifestation of defiance and resistance by the American military since
the publication of the Newburgh addresses over two centuries earlier, at the
close of the American war for independence. Then the officers of the Army
openly contemplated revolt or resignation en masse over the failure of Congress
to pay them or to fund the pensions they had been promised during a long and
debilitating war. All of this led me, as a student of American civil-military rela-
tions, to ask why so loyal, subordinate, and successful a military, as professional
as any in the world, suddenly violated one of its most sacred traditions.
While open conflict soon dropped from public sight, bitterness hardened into a
visceral hatred that became part of the culture of many parts of the military estab-
lishment, kept alive by a continuous stream of incidents and controversies.3 These
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included, to cite but a few: the undermining and driving from office of Secretary
of Defense Les Aspin in 1993, followed by the humiliating withdrawal of his
nominated replacement; controversies over the retirements of at least six four-star
flag officers, including the early retirement of an Air Force chief of staff (an un-
precedented occurrence); and the tragic suicide of a Chief of Naval Operations
(also unprecedented). There were ceaseless arguments over gender, the most
continuous source of conflict between the Clinton administration and its na-
tional security critics.4 The specific episodes ranged from the
botched investigations of the 1991 Tailhook scandal to the 1997
uproar over Air Force first lieutenant Kelly Flinn, the first female
B-52 line pilot, who (despite admitting to adultery, lying to an in-
vestigating officer, and disobeying orders) was allowed to leave the
service without court-martial. Other related incidents included
the outrages at Aberdeen Proving Ground, where Army sergeants
had sex with recruits under their command, and the 1999 retire-
ment of the highest-ranking female Army general in history amid
accusations that she had been sexually harassed by a fellow general
officer some years previously. In addition, there were bitter argu-
ments over readiness; over budgets; over whether and how to in-
tervene with American forces abroad, from Somalia to Haiti to
Bosnia to Kosovo; and over national strategy generally.5
So poisonous became the relationship that two Marine officers in 1998 had to
be reprimanded for violating article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
the provision about contemptuous words against the highest civilian officials.
The assistant commandant of the Marine Corps felt constrained to warn all Ma-
rine generals about officers publicly criticizing or disparaging the commander
in chief.6 The next year, at a military ball at the Plaza Hotel in New York City, a lo-
cal television news anchor, playing on the evening’s theme, “A Return to Integ-
rity,” remarked that he “didn’t recognize any dearth of integrity here” until he
“realized that President Clinton was in town”—and the crowd, “which included
20 generals” and was made up largely of officers, went wild.7 During the election
of 2000, the chief legal officers of two of the largest commands in the Army and
Air Force issued warnings lest resentment over Gore campaign challenges to ab-
sentee ballots in Florida boil over into open contempt.8
These illustrations emphasize the negatives. In contrast, by all accounts peo-
ple in uniform respected and worked well with Secretary of Defense William
Perry. Certainly Generals John Shalikashvili and Hugh Shelton, successive chair-
men of the Joint Chiefs of Staff after 1993, appeared to have been liked and re-
spected by civilians in the Clinton administration. But these men, and other
senior officers and officials who bridged the two cultures at the top levels of
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government, seemed to understand that theirs was a delicate role—to mediate
between two hostile relatives who feared and distrusted each other but realized
that they had to work together if both were to survive.
Now, to discount the Clinton difficulties as atmospherics and thus essentially in-
significant would be mistaken, for the toxicity of the civil-military relationship
damaged national security in at least three ways: first, by paralyzing national se-
curity policy; second, by obstructing and in some cases sabotaging American
ability to intervene in foreign crises or to exercise leadership internationally; and
third, by undermining the confidence of the armed forces in their own uni-
formed leadership.
In response to that first, searing controversy over open homosexual service,
the administration concluded that this president—with his Democratic affilia-
tion, liberal leanings, history of draft evasion and opposition to the Vietnam
War, and admitted marital infidelity and experimentation with mari-
juana—would never be acceptable to the military.9 One knowledgeable insider
characterized the White House of those years as reflecting the demography of
the post-Vietnam Democratic Party—people who had never served in uniform
and who had a “tin ear” for things military. Knowing little or nothing about mil-
itary affairs or national security and not caring to develop a deep or sympathetic
understanding of either, the administration decided that for this president, mili-
tary matters constituted a “third rail.”10 No issue with the military was worth ex-
posing this vulnerability; nothing was worth the cost. All controversy with the
military was therefore to be avoided. In fact, the Clintonites from the beginning
tried to “give away” the military establishment: first to the congressional Demo-
crats, by making Les Aspin secretary of defense; then, when Aspin was driven
from office, to the military itself, by nominating Admiral Bobby Inman; then,
when he withdrew, to the military-industrial complex (with William Perry as
secretary and John Deutsch and John White as deputies), an arrangement that
lasted until 1997; and finally to the Republicans, in the person of Senator Wil-
liam Cohen of Maine. From the outset, the focus of the administration in for-
eign affairs was almost wholly economic in nature, and while that may have been
genius, one result of the Clintonites’ inattention and inconstancy was the disgust
and disrespect of the national security community, particularly those in uni-
form.11 By the time Clinton left office, some officials were admitting that he had
been “unwilling to exercise full authority over military commanders.”12 “Those
who monitored Clinton closely during his eight years as president believed . . .
that he was intimidated more by the military than by any other political force he
dealt with,” reported David Halberstam. Said “a former senior N[ational]
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S[ecurity] C[ouncil] official who studied [Clinton] closely, . . . ‘he was out-and-out
afraid of them.’”13
Forging a reasonable and economical national security policy was crucial to
the health and well-being of the country, particularly at a time of epochal transi-
tion brought on by the end of the Cold War. But both the first Bush and then
Clinton’s administration studiously avoided any public discussion of what role
the United States should play in the world, unless asserting the existence of a
“new world order” or labeling the United States “the indispensable nation” con-
stitutes discussion.14 As for the Clinton administration, indifference to military
affairs and the decision to take no risks and expend no political capital in that
area produced paralysis. Any rethinking of strategy, force structure, roles and
missions of the armed services, organization, personnel, weapons, or other
choices indispensable for the near and long term was rendered futile. As a result,
today, over a decade after the end of the Cold War, there is still no common un-
derstanding about the fundamental purposes of the American military estab-
lishment or the principles by which the United States will decide whether to use
military power in pursuit of the national interest.
The Clinton administration held itself hostage to the organization and force
structure of the Cold War.15 At the beginning of Clinton’s first term, Secretary
Aspin attempted to modify the basis of American strategy—an ability to fight
two “major regional contingencies” (changed later to “major theater wars”) al-
most simultaneously. But Aspin caved in to charges that such a change would
embolden America’s adversaries and weaken security arrangements
with allies in the Middle East and Asia.16 The result was a defense
budget known to be inadequate for the size and configuration of the
military establishment even without the need to fund peacetime in-
tervention contingencies, which constantly threw military accounts
into deficit.17 Budgets became prisoners of readiness. Forces could
not be reduced, because of the many military commitments around
the world, but if readiness to wage high-intensity combat fell or
seemed to diminish, Republican critics would rise up in outrage.
Thus the uniformed leadership—each service chief, regional or func-
tional commander, sometimes even division, task force, or wing com-
manders—possessed the political weight to veto any significant
change in the nation’s fundamental security structure.
As a result, the Clinton administration never could match resources with
commitments, balance readiness with modernization, or consider organiza-
tional changes that would relieve the stresses on personnel and equipment.18 All
of this occurred when the services were on the brink of, or were actually under-
going, what many believed to be changes in weaponry and tactics so major as to
K O H N 1 3
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constitute a “revolution in military affairs.”19 One consequence of the insuffi-
ciency of resources in people and money to meet frequent operational commit-
ments and growing maintenance costs was the loss of many of the best officers
and noncommissioned officers, just as economic prosperity and other factors
were reducing the numbers of men and women willing to sign up for military
service in the first place.
The paralysis in military policy in the 1990s provoked the Congress to at-
tempt by legislation at least four different times to force the Pentagon to reevalu-
ate national security policy, strategy, and force structure, with as yet no
significant result.20 Perhaps the last of these efforts, the U.S. Commission on Na-
tional Security/21st Century (also called the Hart-Rudman Commission),
which undertook a comprehensive review of national security and the military
establishment, will have some effect. If so, it will be because the Bush adminis-
tration possessed the political courage to brave the civil-military friction re-
quired to reorganize an essentially Cold War military establishment into a force
capable of meeting the security challenges of the twenty-first century.21 But the
prospects are not encouraging when one considers Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld’s secrecy and lack of consultation with the
uniformed military and Congress; the forces gather-
ing to resist change; the priority of the Bush tax cut
and national missile defense, which threaten to limit
severely the money available and to force excruciat-
ing choices; and Rumsfeld’s fudging of the very con-
cept of “transformation.” Even the 11 September
2001 terrorist attacks have not broken the logjam, ex-
cept perhaps monetarily. The administration has
committed itself to slow, incremental change so as
not to confront the inherent conservatism of the
armed services or imperil the weapons purchases
pushed so powerfully by defense contractors and
their congressional champions.22 The White House
has done so despite its belief that the failure to exert
civilian control in the 1990s left a military establish-
ment declining in quality and effectiveness.
Second, the Clinton administration—despite far more frequent occasions for
foreign armed intervention (which was ironic, considering its aversion to mili-
tary matters)—was often immobilized over when, where, how, and under what
circumstances to use military force in the world. The long, agonizing debates
and vacillation over intervention in Africa, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia re-
flected in part the weakness of the administration compared to the political
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power of the uniformed military.23 The lack of trust between the two sides dis-
torted decision making to an extreme. Sometimes the military exercised a veto
over the use of American force, or at least an ability so to shape the character of
American intervention that means determined ends—a roundabout way of ex-
ercising a veto. At other times, civilians ignored or even avoided receiving advice
from the military. By the 1999 Kosovo air campaign, the consultative relation-
ship had so broken down that the president was virtually divorced from his the-
ater commander, and that commander’s communications with the secretary of
defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs were corrupted by misunderstanding
and distrust. The result was a campaign misconceived at the outset and badly co-
ordinated not only between civilian and military but between the various levels
of command. The consequences could have undone the Nato alliance, and they
certainly stiffened Serbian will, exacerbated divisions within Nato councils, in-
creased criticism in the United States, and prolonged the campaign beyond what
almost everyone involved had predicted.24
Last, the incessant acrimony—the venomous atmosphere in Washing-
ton—shook the confidence of the armed forces in their own leadership. Differ-
ent groups accused the generals and admirals, at one extreme, of caving in to
political correctness, and at the other, of being rigid and hidebound with respect
to gender integration, war-fighting strategy, and organizational change. The im-
pact on morale contributed to the hemorrhage from the profession of arms of
able young and middle-rank officers. The loss of so many fine officers, com-
bined with declines in recruiting (which probably brought, in turn, a diminu-
tion in the quality of new officers and enlisted recruits), may weaken the nation’s
military leadership in the next generation and beyond, posing greater danger to
national security than would any policy blunder. Certainly many complex fac-
tors have driven people out of uniform and impaired recruiting, but the loss of
confidence in the senior uniformed leadership has been cited by many as a rea-
son to leave the service.25
Now, to attribute all of these difficulties to the idiosyncrasies of the Clinton
administration alone would be a mistake. In fact, the recent friction in civil-
military relations and unwillingness to exert civilian control have roots all the
way back to World War II. Unquestionably Mr. Clinton and his appointees bun-
gled civil-military relations badly, from the beginning. But other administra-
tions have done so also, and others will in the future.
If one measures civilian control not by the superficial standard of who signs
the papers and passes the laws but by the relative influence of the uniformed mil-
itary and civilian policy makers in the two great areas of concern in military af-
fairs—national security policy, and the use of force to protect the country and
K O H N 1 5
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project power abroad—then civilian control has deteriorated significantly in the
last generation. In theory, civilians have the authority to issue virtually any order
and organize the military in any fashion they choose. But in practice, the rela-
tionship is far more complex. Both sides frequently disagree among themselves.
Further, the military can evade or circumscribe civilian authority by framing the
alternatives or tailoring their advice or predicting nasty consequences; by leak-
ing information or appealing to public opinion (through various indirect chan-
nels, like lobbying groups or retired generals and admirals); or by approaching
friends in the Congress for support. They can even fail to implement decisions,
or carry them out in such a way as to stymie their intent. The reality is that civil-
ian control is not a fact but a process, measured across a spectrum—something
situational, dependent on the people, issues, and the political and military forces
involved. We are not talking about a coup here, or anything else demonstrably il-
legal; we are talking about who calls the tune in military affairs in the United
States today.26
Contrast the weakness of the civilian side with the strength of the military,
not only in the policy process but in clarity of definition of American purpose,
consistency of voice, and willingness to exert influence both in public and be-
hind the scenes.
The power of the military within the policy process has been growing steadily
since a low point under Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in the 1960s.
Under the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, the chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) has influence that surpasses that of everyone
else within the Pentagon except the secretary of defense, and the chairman pos-
sesses a more competent, focused, and effective staff than the secretary does, as
well as, often, a clearer set of goals, fewer political constraints, and under some
circumstances greater credibility with the public.27 In the glow of success in the
Gulf War, efforts to exorcise Vietnam, the high public esteem now enjoyed by the
armed forces, and the disgust Americans have felt for politics in general and for
partisanship in particular, the stature of the chairman has grown to a magnitude
out of proportion to his legal or institutional position.
The Joint Staff is the most powerful organization in the Department of De-
fense; frequently, by dint of its speed, agility, knowledge, and expertise, the Joint
Staff frames the choices.28 The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (the vice
chiefs, convening under the vice chairman to prioritize joint programs in terms
of need and cost) has gathered influence and authority over the most basic issues
of weapons and force structure.29 Within the bureaucracy, JCS has a represen-
tative in the interagency decision process, giving the uniformed military a
voice separate from that of the Department of Defense. Similarly, the armed
services maintain their own congressional liaison and public affairs offices,
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bureaucracies so large that they are impossible to monitor fully. (One officer ad-
mitted to me privately that his duty on Capitol Hill was to encourage Congress
to restore a billion dollars that the Pentagon’s civilian leadership had cut out of
his service’s budget request.)30 Moreover, the regional commanders have come
to assume such importance in their areas—particularly in the Pacific, the Mid-
dle East, and Central Asia—that they have effectively displaced American am-
bassadors and the State Department as the primary instruments of American
foreign policy.31 In recent reorganizations, these commanders have so increased
in stature and influence within the defense establishment that their testimony
can sway Congress and embarrass or impede the administration, especially
when the civilians in the executive branch are weak and the Congress is domi-
nated by an aggressively led opposition political party.
One knowledgeable commentator put it this way in early 1999: “The dirty lit-
tle secret of American civil-military relations, by no means unique to this [the
Clinton] administration, is that the commander in chief does not command the
military establishment; he cajoles it, negotiates with it, and, as necessary, ap-
peases it.”32 A high Pentagon civilian privately substantiates the interpretation:
what “weighs heavily . . . every day” is “the reluctance, indeed refusal, of the po-
litical appointees to disagree with the military on any matter, not just opera-
tional matters.” In fact, so powerful have such institutional forces become, and
so intractable the problem of altering the military establishment, that the new
Rumsfeld regime in the Pentagon decided to conduct its comprehensive review
of national defense in strict secrecy, effectively cutting the regional command-
ers, the service chiefs, and the Congress out of the process so that resistance
could not organize in advance of the intended effort at transformation.33
Furthermore, senior military leaders have been able to use their personal le-
verage for a variety of purposes, sometimes because of civilian indifference, or
deference, or ignorance, sometimes because they have felt it necessary to fill
voids of policy and decision making. But sometimes the influence is exercised
intentionally and purposefully, even aggressively. After fifty years of cold war,
the “leak,” the bureaucratic maneuver, the alliance with partisans in Con-
gress—the ménage à trois between the administration, Congress, and the mili-
tary—have become a way of life, in which services and groups employ their
knowledge, contacts, and positions to promote personal or institutional agen-
das.34 In the 1970s, responding to the view widely held among military officers
that a reserve callup would have galvanized public support for Vietnam, allowed
intensified prosecution of the war, and prevented divorce between the Army and
the American people, the Army chief of staff deliberately redesigned divisions to
contain “round-out” units of reserve or National Guard troops, making it im-
possible for the president to commit the Army to battle on a large scale without
K O H N 1 7
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mobilizing the reserves and Guard.35 In the 1980s, the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, Admiral William J. Crowe, worked “behind the scenes” to encourage
Congress to strengthen his own office even though the secretary of defense op-
posed such a move. During the Iran-Iraq War Crowe pushed for American es-
cort of Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf, because he believed it important for
American foreign policy. He and the chiefs strove to slow the Reagan adminis-
tration’s strategic missile defense program. Crowe even went so far as to create a
personal communications channel with his Soviet military counterpart, appar-
ently unknown to his civilian superiors, to avert any possibility of a misunder-
standing leading to war. “It was in the nature of the Chairman’s job,” Crowe
remembered, “that I occasionally found myself fighting against
Defense Department positions as well as for them.”36
In the 1990s, press leaks from military sources led directly to
the weakening and ultimate dismissal of the Clinton administra-
tion’s first secretary of defense.37 In 1994 the Chief of Naval Op-
erations (CNO) openly discussed with senior commanders his
plans to manipulate the Navy budget and operations tempo to
force his preferred priorities on the Office of the Secretary of De-
fense and Congress. When a memo recounting the conversation
surfaced in the press, no civilian in authority called the CNO to
account.38 The 1995 Commission on the Roles and Missions of
the Armed Forces recommended consolidating the staffs of the service chiefs
and the service secretaries; no one mentioned the diminution of civilian control
that would have taken place as a result.39
Even during the 1990s, a period when the administration appeared to be
forceful, insisting upon the use of American forces over military objections or
resistance, the uniformed leadership often arbitrated events. The 1995 Bosnia
intervention was something of a paradigm. American priorities seem to have
been, first, deploying in overwhelming strength, in order to suffer few if any ca-
sualties; second, establishing a deadline for exit; third, issuing “robust” rules of
engagement, again to forestall casualties; fourth, narrowing the definition of the
mission to ensure that it was incontrovertibly “doable”; and fifth—fifth—recon-
structing Bosnia as a viable independent country.40
In recent years senior uniformed leaders have spoken out on issues of policy—
undoubtedly often with the encouragement or at least the acquiescence of civil-
ian officials, but not always so. Sometimes these pronouncements endeavor to
sell policies and decisions to the public or within the government before a presi-
dential decision, even though such advocacy politicizes the chairman, a chief, or
a regional commander and inflates their influence in discussions of policy. A
four-star general, a scant ten days after retiring, publishes a long article in our
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most respected foreign affairs journal, preceded by a New York Times op-ed
piece. In them, he criticizes the administration’s most sensitive (and vulnerable)
policy—and virtually no one in the press or elsewhere questions whether his ac-
tion was professionally appropriate.41 The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
gives “an impassioned interview” to the New York Times “on the folly of inter-
vention” in Bosnia as “the first Bush administration” is pondering “the question
of whether to intervene.”42 Another chairman coins the “Dover Principle,” cau-
tioning the civilian leadership about the human and political costs of casualties
when American forces are sent into some crisis or conflict (and service mem-
bers’ bodies return through the joint mortuary at Dover Air Force Base). This
lecture clearly aimed to establish boundaries in the public’s mind and to con-
strain civilian freedom of action in intervening overseas.
Certainly Generals Shalikashvili and Shelton have been fairly circumspect
about speaking out on issues of policy, and the current chairman, Air Force gen-
eral Richard B. Myers, even more. However, their predecessor, Colin Powell, pos-
sessed and used extraordinary power throughout his tenure as chairman of the
JCS. He conceived and then sold to a skeptical secretary of defense and a divided
Congress the “Base Force” reorganization and reduction in 1990–91. He shaped
the U.S. prosecution of the Gulf War to ensure limited objectives, the use of
overwhelming force, a speedy end to combat, and the immediate exit of Ameri-
can forces. He spoke frequently on matters of policy during and after the elec-
tion of 1992—an op-ed in the New York Times and a more comprehensive
statement of foreign policy in the quarterly Foreign Affairs. Powell essentially ve-
toed intervention in Somalia and Bosnia, ignored or circumvented the chiefs on
a regular basis, and managed the advisory process so as to present only single al-
ternatives to civilian policy makers. All of this antedated his forcing President
Clinton in 1993 to back down on allowing homosexuals to serve openly.43 In fact,
General Powell became so powerful and so adept in the bureaucratic manipulations
that often decide crucial questions before the final decision maker affixes a signature
that in 2001 the Bush administration installed an experienced, powerful, highly re-
spected figure at the Defense Department specifically lest Powell control the entire
foreign and national security apparatus in the new administration.44
All of these are examples—and only public manifestations—of a policy and
decision-making process that has tilted far more toward the military than ever
before in American history in peacetime.
Now an essential question arises: do these developments differ from previous
practice or experience in American history? At first glance, the answer might
seem to be no. Military and civilian have often differed, and the military has for
many years acted on occasion beyond what might be thought proper in a
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republican system of government, a system that defines civilian control, or mili-
tary subordination to civil authority, as obligatory.
Historical examples abound. Leading generals and chiefs of staff of the Army
from James Wilkinson in the 1790s through Maxwell Taylor in the 1950s have
fought with presidents and secretaries of war or defense in the open and in pri-
vate over all sorts of issues—including key military policies in times of crisis. Of-
ficers openly disparaged Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War; that president’s
problems with his generals became legendary.45 Two commanding generals of
the Army were so antagonistic toward the War Department that they moved
their headquarters out of Washington: Winfield Scott to New York in the 1850s,
and William Tecumseh Sherman to St. Louis in the 1870s.46 In the 1880s, reform-
minded naval officers connived to modernize the Navy from wood and sail to
steel and steam. To do so they drew the civilian leadership into the process,
forged an alliance with the steel industry, and (for the first time in American his-
tory, and in coordination with political and economic elites) sold naval reform
and a peacetime buildup of standing forces to the public through publications,
presentations, displays, reviews, and other precursors of the promotional public
relations that would be used so frequently—and effectively—in the twentieth
century.47 In the 1920s and 1930s, the youthful Army Air Corps became so adept
at public relations and at generating controversy over airpower that three different
presidential administrations were forced to appoint high-level boards of outsiders
to study how the Army could (or could not) properly incorporate aviation.48
Both Presidents Roosevelt complained bitterly about the resistance of the
armed services to change. “You should go through the experience of trying to get
any changes in the thinking . . . and action of the career diplomats and then you’d
know what a real problem was,” FDR complained in 1940. “But the Treasury and
the State Department put together are nothing as compared with the Na-a-vy. . . .
To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like punching a feather bed. You punch it
with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted,
and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started punching.”49
The interservice battles of the 1940s and 1950s were so fierce that neither
Congress nor the president could contain them. Internecine warfare blocked
President Harry Truman’s effort to unify the armed forces in the 1940s (“unifi-
cation” finally produced only loose confederation) and angered President
Dwight D. Eisenhower through the 1950s. Neither administration fully con-
trolled strategy, force structure, or weapons procurement; both had to fight ser-
vice parochialism and interests; and both ruled largely by imposing top-line
budget limits and forcing the services to struggle over a limited funding “pie.”
Eisenhower replaced or threatened to fire several of his chiefs. Only through
Byzantine maneuvers, managerial wizardry, and draconian measures did Robert
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McNamara bring a modicum of coherence and integration to the overall ad-
ministration of the Defense Department in the 1960s. The price, however, was a
ruthless, relentless bureaucratic struggle that not only contributed to the disaster
of Vietnam but left a legacy of suspicion and deceit that infects American
civil-military relations to this day.50 (Even today, embittered officers identify their
nemesis by his full name—Robert Strange McNamara—to express their loath-
ing.) The point of this history is that civil-military rela-
tions are messy and frequently antagonistic; military
people do on occasion defy civilians; civilian control is
situational.51
But the present differs from the past in four crucial
ways.
First, the military has now largely united to shape,
oppose, evade, or thwart civilian choices, whereas in the
past the armed services were usually divided internally
or among themselves. Indeed, most civil-military con-
flict during the Cold War arose from rivalry between
the services, and over roles, missions, budgets, or new
weapons systems—not whether and how to use Ameri-
can armed forces, or general military policy.
Second, many of the issues in play today reach far be-
yond the narrowly military, not only to the wider realm
of national security but often to foreign relations more
broadly. In certain cases military affairs even affect the
character and values of American society itself.
Third, the role of military leaders has drifted over the last generation from
that primarily of advisers and advocates within the private confines of the exec-
utive branch to a much more public function. As we have noted, they champion
not just their services but policies and decisions in and beyond the military
realm, and sometimes they mobilize public or congressional opinion either di-
rectly or indirectly (whether in Congress or the executive branch) prior to deci-
sion by civilian officials. To give but three examples: senior officers spoke out
publicly on whether the United States should sign a treaty banning the use of
land mines; on whether American forces should be put into the Balkans to stop
ethnic cleansing; and on whether the nation should support the establishment
of the International Criminal Court. Again, such actions are not unprecedented,
but they have occurred recently with increasing frequency, and collectively they
represent a significant encroachment on civilian control of the military.52
Fourth, senior officers now lead a permanent peacetime military establish-
ment that differs fundamentally from any of its predecessors. Unlike the large
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citizen forces raised in wartime and during the Cold War, today’s armed services
are professional and increasingly disconnected, even in some ways estranged,
from civilian society. Yet in comparison to previous peacetime professional
forces, which were also isolated from civilian culture, today’s are far larger, far
more involved worldwide, far more capable, and often indispensable (even on a
daily basis) to American foreign policy and world politics. Five decades of war-
fare and struggle against communism, moreover, have created something en-
tirely new in American history—a separate military community, led by the
regular forces but including also the National Guard and reserves, veterans orga-
nizations, and the communities, labor sectors, industries, and pressure groups
active in military affairs. More diverse than the “military-industrial complex” of
President Eisenhower’s farewell address forty years ago, this “military” has be-
come a recognizable interest group. Also, it is larger, more bureaucratically ac-
tive, more political, more partisan, more purposeful, and more influential than
anything similar in American history.53
One might argue that this is all temporary, the unique residue of sixty years of
world and cold war, and that it will dissipate and balance will return now that the
Clinton administration is history. Perhaps—but civil-military conflict is not
very likely to diminish. In “Rumsfeld’s Rules,” Donald Rumsfeld states that his
primary function is “to exercise civilian control over the Department for the
Commander-in-Chief and the country.” He understands that he possesses “the
right to get into anything and exercise it [i.e., civilian control].” He recognizes as
a rule, “When cutting staff at the Pentagon, don’t eliminate the thin layer that as-
sures civilian control.”54 Nonetheless, his effort to recast the military establish-
ment for the post–Cold War era—as promised during the 2000 presidential
campaign—provoked such immediate and powerful resistance (and not just by
the armed forces) that he abandoned any plans to force reorganization or cut
“legacy” weapons systems.55 In the Afghanistan campaign, Rumsfeld and other
civilian leaders have reportedly been frustrated by an apparent lack of imagina-
tion on the part of the military; in return, at least one four-star has accused
Rumsfeld of “micromanagement.”56 There is also other evidence of conflict to
come; traditional conceptions of military professionalism—particularly the
ethical and professional norms of the officer corps—have been evolving away
from concepts and behaviors that facilitate civil-military cooperation.
If the manifestations of diminished civilian control were simply a sine
curve—that is, a low period in a recurring pattern—or the coincidence of a
strong Joint Chiefs and a weak president during a critical transitional period in
American history and national defense (the end of the Cold War), there would
be little cause for concern. Civilian control, as we have seen, is situational and
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indeed to a degree cyclical. But the present decline extends back before the
Clinton administration. There are indications that the current trend began be-
fore the Vietnam War and has since been aggravated by a weakening of the na-
tion’s social, political, and institutional structures that had, over the course of
American history, assured civilian control.
For more than two centuries, civilian control has rested on four foundations
that individually and in combination not only prevented any direct military
threat to civilian government but kept military influence, even in wartime,
largely contained within the boundaries of professional expertise and concerns.
First has been the rule of law, and with it reverence for a constitution that pro-
vided explicitly for civilian control of the military. Any violation of the Consti-
tution or its process has been sure to bring retribution from one or all three of
the branches of government, with public support. Second, Americans once kept
their regular forces small. The United States relied in peacetime on ocean
boundaries to provide sufficient warning of attack and depended on a policy of
mobilization to repel invasion or to wage war. Thus the regular military could
never endanger civilian government—in peacetime because of its size, and in
wartime because the ranks were filled with citizens unlikely to cooperate or ac-
quiesce in anything illegal or unconstitutional. The very reliance on citizen sol-
diers—militia, volunteers, and conscripts pressed temporarily into service to
meet an emergency—was a third safeguard of civilian control. Finally, the armed
forces themselves internalized military subordination to civil authority. They
accepted it willingly as an axiom of American government and the foundation
of military professionalism. “You must remember that when we enter the army
we do so with the full knowledge that our first duty is toward the government,
entirely regardless of our own views under any given circumstances,” Major
General John J. Pershing instructed First Lieutenant George S. Patton, Jr., in
1916. “We are at liberty to express our personal views only when called upon to
do so or else confidentially to our friends, but always confidentially and with the
complete understanding that they are in no sense to govern our actions.”57 As
Omar Bradley, the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, put it, “Thirty-two
years in the peacetime army had taught me to do my job, hold my tongue, and
keep my name out of the papers.”58
Much has changed. More than sixty years of hot and cold war, a large military
establishment, world responsibilities, a searing failure in Vietnam, and changes
in American society, among other factors, have weakened these four founda-
tions upon which civilian control has rested in the United States.
The first, and most troubling, development is the skepticism, even cynicism,
now expressed about government, lawyers, and justice, part of a broad and gen-
eration-long diminution of respect for people and institutions that has eroded
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American civic culture and faith in law. Polling data show that Americans today
have the most confidence in their least democratic institutions: the military,
small business, the police, and the Supreme Court. Americans express the least
confidence in the most democratic: Congress.59 So dangerous is this trend that
Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government established a “Visions of Governance
for the Twenty-first Century” project to explore the phenomenon, study its impli-
cations, and attempt to counteract some of its more deleterious effects.60 Ameri-
cans cannot continue to vilify government, the U.S. government in particular, and
expect patriotism to prosper or even survive as a fundamental civic value.
Second, the media, traditionally the herald of liberty in this society, has be-
come less substantial, more superficial, less knowledgeable, more focused on
profit, less professional, and more trivial. About the only liberty the media seems
to champion vocally is the freedom of the press. Issues of civilian control seem to
escape the press; time after time, events or issues that in past years would have
been framed or interpreted as touching upon civilian control now go unnoticed
and unreported, at least in those terms.61
Third, the nation’s core civic culture has deteriorated. Such basic social insti-
tutions as marriage and the family, and such indicators of society’s health as
crime rates and out-of-wedlock births, while stabilizing or improving in the
1990s, clearly have weakened over time. Our communities, neighborhoods, civic
organizations, fraternal groups, and social gatherings have diminished in favor
of individual entertainment; people are staying at home with cable television,
the videocassette recorder, and the Internet, thereby avoiding crime, crowds,
traffic, and the crumbling physical and social infrastructure of our society.
American society has become more splintered and people more isolated into
small groups, “clustered” geographically and demographically around similar
values, culture, and lifestyles. With this deterioration of civic cohesion—gated
communities being perhaps emblematic—has come a weakening of shared val-
ues: less truthfulness, less generosity, less sacrifice, less social consciousness, less
faith, less common agreement on ethical behavior, and more advocacy, acri-
mony, individualism, relativism, materialism, cynicism, and self-gratification.
The 11 September attacks and the war on terrorism are unlikely to reverse these
trends as long as the national leadership exhorts the American people to go back
to “normal.”62
Civilian control is one common understanding that seems to have faded in
American civic consciousness. The American people—whose study and under-
standing of civics and government generally have declined—have lost their tra-
ditional skepticism about the professional military that made civilian control a
core political assumption, one that was widely understood and periodically
voiced. Simply put, the public no longer thinks about civilian control—does not
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understand it, does not discuss it, and does not grasp how it can and should op-
erate.63 An occasional popular movie like The Siege and Thirteen Days raises the
issue, but most recent films caricature the military or, like GI Jane and Rules of
Engagement, lionize an honest, brave, faithful military and demonize lying, ava-
ricious politicians.64
Fourth, in the last generation the United States has abandoned the first prin-
ciple of civilian control, the bedrock practice extending back into premodern
England—reliance on the citizen soldier for national defense.65 National secu-
rity policy no longer seriously envisions mobilizing industry and the population
for large-scale war. Americans in uniform, whether they serve for one hitch or an
entire career, are taught to (and do) view themselves as professionals. In the Na-
tional Guard and reserves, whose members are thought to be the apotheosis of cit-
izen soldiers, some hold civilian government jobs in their units or elsewhere in the
government national security community, and others serve on active duty consid-
erably more than the traditional one weekend a month and two weeks a year.66
Furthermore, while Guardsmen and reservists both voice and believe the tra-
ditional rhetoric about citizen-soldiering, the views of their up-and-coming of-
ficers mirror almost exactly those of their regular counterparts.67 Reserve forces
are spending more and more time on active duty, not simply for temporary duty
for the present crisis of homeland defense. Increasingly, the National Guard and
reserves are being used interchangeably with the regulars, even in overseas de-
ployments on constabulary missions, something wholly unprecedented.68 Even
if they call themselves citizen soldiers, the fundamental distinction between citi-
zens and soldiers has so blurred that in 1998, at two of the most respected U.S.
institutions of professional military education, Marine majors who had spent
their adult lives in uniform and National Guard adjutant generals who had done
the same could both insist that they were “citizen soldiers.”69 Americans have
lost the high regard they once possessed for temporary military service as an ob-
ligation of citizenship, along with their former understanding of its underlying
contribution to civic cohesion and civilian control of the military.70
Today, fewer Americans serve or know people who do, and the numbers will
decline as smaller percentages of the population serve in uniform.71 Their sense
of ownership of or interest in the military, and their understanding of the dis-
tinctiveness of military culture—its ethos and needs—have declined. In recent
years the number of veterans serving in the U.S. Congress has fallen 50 percent,
and the remaining veterans constitute a smaller percentage of the members of
Congress than veterans do of the population as a whole, reversing (in 1995) a
pattern that had endured since the turn of the century.72 The effect is dramatic;
less than ten years ago, 62 percent of the Senate and 41 percent of the House were
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veterans. Today in the 107th Congress, the figure for the Senate is 38 percent, and
for the House, 29 percent.73
Finally, at the same time that civilian control has weakened in the awareness
of the public, so too has the principle declined in the consciousness and profes-
sional understanding of the American armed forces. Historically, one of the
chief bulwarks of civilian control has been the American military establishment
itself. Its small size in peacetime, the professionalism of the officers, their politi-
cal neutrality, their willing subordination, and their acceptance of a set of un-
written but largely understood rules of behavior in the civil-military
relationship—all had made civilian control succeed, messy as it sometimes was
and situational as it must always be. In the last half-century, however, while ev-
eryone in the armed forces has continued to support the concept, the ethos and
mentalité of the officer corps have changed in ways that damage civil-military
cooperation and undermine civilian control.
Reversing a century and a half of practice, the American officer corps has be-
come partisan in political affiliation, and overwhelmingly Republican. Begin-
ning with President Richard Nixon’s politics of polarization—the “southern
strategy” and reaching out to the “hard-hats”—Republicans embraced tradi-
tional patriotism and strong national defense as central parts of their national
agenda. During the late 1970s—years of lean defense budgets and the “hollow
force”—and in the 1980s, when Ronald Reagan made rebuilding the armed
forces and taking the offensive in the Cold War centerpieces of his presidency,
Republicans reached out to the military as a core constituency. They succeeded
in part because, in the wake of Vietnam, the Democratic Party virtually aban-
doned the military, offering antimilitary rhetoric and espousing reduced de-
fense spending. During the same period, voting in elections began to become a
habit in the officer corps. In the 1950s, the Federal Voting Assistance Program
came into existence in order to help enlisted men, most of whom were draftees
or draft-induced volunteers, to vote. In every unit an officer was designated to
connect the program to the men, and undoubtedly the task began to break down
slowly what had been something of a taboo against officers exercising their fran-
chise. How (the logic must have been) could officers encourage their soldiers to
vote if they themselves abstained?74
Today the vast majority of officers not only vote but identify with a political
philosophy and party. Comparison of a sample by the Triangle Institute of Secu-
rity Studies of active-duty officers (see endnote 25) with earlier data shows a
shift from over 54 percent independent, “no preference,” or “other” in a 1976
survey to 28 percent in 1998–99, and from 33 percent to 64 percent Republican
today.75 In the presidential election of 2000, Republicans targeted military voters
by organizing endorsements from retired flag officers, advertising in military
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publications, using Gulf War heroes Colin Powell and H. Norman Schwarzkopf
on the campaign trail, urging service members to register and vote, and focusing
special effort on absentee military voters—a group that proved critical, perhaps
the margin of victory, in Florida, where thousands of armed forces personnel
maintain their legal residency.76
Before the present generation, American military officers (since before the
Civil War) had abstained as a group from party politics, studiously avoiding any
partisanship of word or deed, activity, or affiliation. By George C. Marshall’s
time, the practice was not even to vote.77A handful of the most senior officers
pursued political ambitions, usually trying to parlay wartime success into the
presidency. A very few even ran for office while on active duty. But these were ex-
ceptions. The belief was that the military, as the neutral servant of the state,
stood above the dirty business of politics. Professional norms dictated faith and
loyalty not just in deed but in spirit to whoever held the reins of power under the
constitutional system. For Marshall’s generation, partisan affiliation and voting
conflicted with military professionalism.78
Marshall and his fellow officers must have sensed that the habit of voting leads
to partisan thinking, inclining officers to become invested in particular policy
choices or decisions that relate directly to their professional responsibilities.79 Of-
ficers at every level have to bring difficult and sometimes unpopular duties to their
troops and motivate the latter to carry them out. Likewise, senior officers must
represent the needs and perspectives of the troops to political leaders even when
they are unsolicited or unwanted. How effective can that ad-
vice be if the civilians know the officers are opposed to a
policy in question? What are the effects on morale when the
troops know their officers dislike, disrespect, or disagree
with the politicians, or think a mission is unwise, ill con-
ceived, or unnecessary?
The consequences of partisanship can also be more sub-
tle and indirect but equally far-reaching, even to the point
of contempt for civilian policy and politicians or of unpro-
fessional, disruptive behavior, as in 1993. The belief is cur-
rent today among officers that the core of the Democratic
Party is “hostile to military culture” and engaged in a “cul-
ture war” against the armed forces, mostly because of pres-
sure for further gender integration and open homosexual
service.80 During the 2000 election campaign, when Al Gore
stumbled briefly by supporting a “litmus test” on gays in
the military for selecting members of the Joint Chiefs, he
confirmed for many in uniform the idea that Democrats do
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not understand the military profession or care about its effectiveness. His cam-
paign’s effort to minimize the effect of absentee votes in Florida and elsewhere
through technical challenges outraged the armed forces, raising worries that a
Gore victory might spark an exodus from the ranks or that a Gore administra-
tion would have relations with the military even more troubled than Clinton’s.81
Partisan politicization loosens the connection of the military to the Ameri-
can people. If the public begins to perceive the military as an interest group
driven by its own needs and agenda, support—and trust—will diminish. Al-
ready there are hints. When a random survey asked a thousand Americans in the
fall of 1998 how often military leaders would try to avoid carrying out orders
they opposed, over two-thirds answered at least “some of the time.”82
Partisanship also poisons the relationship between the president and the uni-
formed leadership. When a group of retired flag officers, including former re-
gional commanders and members of the Joint Chiefs, endorsed presidential
candidates in 1992 and again in 2000, they broadcast their politicization to the
public and further legitimated partisanship in the ranks—for everyone knows
that four-stars never really retire. Like princes of the church, they represent the
culture and the profession just as authoritatively as their counterparts on active
duty. If senior retired officers make a practice of endorsing presidential con-
tenders, will the politicians trust the generals and admirals on active duty, in
particular those who serve at the top, to have the loyalty and discretion not to re-
tire and use their inside knowledge to try to overturn policies or elect oppo-
nents? Will not presidents begin to vet candidates for the top jobs for their
pliability or (equally deleteriously) their party or political views, rather than for
excellence, achievement, character, and candor? Over time, the result will be
weak military advice, declining military effectiveness, and accelerating
politicization.
The investment of officers in one policy or another will lead civilians to ques-
tion whether military recommendations are the best professional advice of the
nation’s military experts. Perhaps one reason Bill Clinton and his people dealt
with the military at arm’s length was that he and they knew that officers were the
most solidly Republican group in the government.83 One need only read Richard
Holbrooke’s memoir about negotiating the Dayton accords in 1995 to plumb
the depth of suspicion between military and civilian at the highest levels. Con-
vinced that the military opposed the limited bombing campaign against the
Bosnian Serbs, Holbrooke and Secretary of State Warren Christopher believed
that the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs was lying to them when he asserted
that the Air Force was running out of targets.84
Certainly officers have the right to vote and to participate privately in the na-
tion’s political life. No one questions the legal entitlement of retired officers to
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run for office or endorse candidates. But these officers must recognize the corro-
sive effects on military professionalism and the threat to the military establish-
ment’s relationship with Congress, the executive branch, and the American
people that such partisan behavior has. Possessing a right and exercising it are
two very different things.
A second example of changing military professionalism has been the wide-
spread attitude among officers that civilian society has become corrupt, even de-
generate, while the military has remained a repository for virtue, perhaps its one
remaining bastion, in an increasingly unraveling social fabric, of the traditional
values that make the country strong. Historically, officers have often decried the
selfishness, commercialism, and disorder that seems to characterize much of
American society.85 But that opinion today has taken on a harder, more critical,
more moralistic edge; it is less leavened by that sense of acceptance that enabled
officers in the past to tolerate the clash between their values and those of a demo-
cratic, individualistic civilian culture and to reconcile the conflict with their
own continued service.
Nearly 90 percent of the elite military officers (regular and reserves) surveyed
in 1998–99 by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies agreed that “the decline
of traditional values is contributing to the breakdown of our society.” Some 70
percent thought that “through leading by example, the military could help
American society become more moral,” and 75 percent believed that “civilian
society would be better off if it adopted more of the military’s values and cus-
toms.”86 Is it healthy for civilian control when the members of the American
armed forces believe that they are morally, organizationally, institutionally, and
personally superior to the rest of society—and are contemptuous of that soci-
ety? Do we wish civic society in a democratic country to adopt military norms,
values, outlooks, and behaviors? In my judgment that is an utter misreading of
the role and function of our armed forces. Their purpose is to defend society, not
to define it. The latter is militarism, in the classic definition—the same thinking
that in part inclined the French and German armies to intervene in the politics
of their nations in the twentieth century.
A third, and most disturbing, change in military sentiment is the belief that
officers should confront and resist civilians whose policies or decisions they be-
lieve threaten to weaken national defense or lead the country into disaster. Many
hold that officers should speak out publicly, or work behind the scenes, to stop
or modify a policy, or resign in protest. Some senior leaders have been willing to
speak publicly on issues of national security, foreign relations, and military pol-
icy before it is formulated, and afterward as spokespersons for what are often
highly controversial and partisan initiatives or programs. In 1998 and 1999, the
respected retired Army colonel and political scientist Sam Sarkesian, and the
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much-decorated Marine veteran, novelist, and former secretary of the Navy
James Webb, called publicly for military leaders to participate in national secu-
rity policy debates, not merely as advisers to the civilian leadership but as public
advocates, an idea that seems to resonate with many in the armed forces today.87
“Military subservience to political control applies to existing policy, not to pol-
icy debates,” admonished Webb—as if officers can subscribe to policy and de-
bate it honestly at the same time.88 Such behavior politicizes military issues and
professional officers directly, for rare is the military issue that remains insulated
from politics and broader national life.
This willingness—indeed, in some cases eagerness—to strive to shape public
opinion and thereby affect decisions and policy outcomes is a dangerous devel-
opment for the U.S. military and is extraordinarily corrosive of civilian control.
Is it proper for military officers to leak information to the press “to discredit spe-
cific policies—procurement decisions, prioritization plans, operations that the
leaker opposes,” as Admiral Crowe in his memoirs admits happens “sometimes,”
even “copiously”?89 Is it proper for the four services, the regional commanders,
or the Joint Chiefs every year to advocate to the public directly their needs for
ships, airplanes, divisions, troops, and other resources, or their views on what
percentage of the nation’s economy should go to defense as opposed to other
priorities?90 This advocacy reached such a cacophony in the fall of 2000 that the
secretary of defense warned the military leadership not “to beat the drum with a
tin cup” for their budgets during the presidential campaign and the transition to
a new administration.91
Do we wish the military leadership to argue the merits of intervention in the
Balkans or elsewhere, of whether to sign treaties on land-mine use or war
crimes, in order to mobilize public opinion one way or the other, before the pres-
ident decides? Imagine that we are back in 1941. Should the Army and the Navy
pronounce publicly on the merits or demerits of Lend-Lease, or convoy escort,
or the occupation of Iceland, or the Europe-first strategy? Or imagine it is
1861—should the nation’s military leaders publicly discuss whether to reinforce
Fort Sumter? Would it be advisable for senior officers to proclaim openly their
varied opinions of whether the South’s secession ought to (or can) be opposed
by plunging the country into civil war? Should senior military officers question
the president’s strategy in the midst of a military operation, as was done in 1999
through media leaks in the first week of the bombing campaign over Kosovo?92
In such instances, what happens to the president’s, and Congress’s, authority
and credibility with the public, and to their ability to lead the nation? How does
such advocacy affect the trust and confidence between the president, his cabinet
officers, and the most senior generals and admirals, trust and confidence that is
so necessary for effective national defense?93
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The way in which military officers have interpreted a study of the role of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in the decision on intervention and in the formulation of
strategy for Southeast Asia in 1963–65 exemplifies the erosion of professional
norms and values. H. R. McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert
McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies That Led to Vietnam is by all ac-
counts the history book most widely read and discussed in the military in the
last several years.94 Officers believe that McMaster validates long-standing mili-
tary convictions about Vietnam—that the Joint Chiefs, lacking a proper under-
standing of their role and not having the courage to oppose the Johnson
administration’s strategy of gradualism that they knew would fail, should have
voiced their opposition, publicly if necessary, and resigned rather than carry out
that strategy. Had they done so, goes this credo, they would have saved the coun-
try a tragic, costly, humiliating, and above all, unnecessary, defeat.95
McMaster’s book neither says nor implies that the chiefs should have ob-
structed U.S. policy in Vietnam in any other way than by presenting their views
frankly and forcefully to their civilian superiors, and speaking honestly to the
Congress when asked for their views. It neither states nor suggests that the chiefs
should have opposed President Lyndon Johnson’s orders and policies by leaks,
public statements, or by resignations, unless an officer personally and profes-
sionally could not stand, morally and ethically, to carry out the chosen policy.
There is in fact no tradition of resignation in the American military. In 1783, at
Newburgh, New York, as the war for independence was ending, the American of-
ficer corps rejected individual or mass resigna-
tion—which can be indistinguishable from mutiny.
George Washington persuaded them not to march on
Congress or refuse orders in response to congressional
unwillingness to pay them or guarantee their
hard-earned pensions. The precedent has survived for
more than two centuries. No American army ever
again considered open insubordination.
Proper professional behavior cannot include sim-
ply walking away from a policy, an operation, or a war
an officer believes is wrong or will fail. That is what the
Left advocated during the Vietnam War, and the
American military rightly rejected it. Imagine the con-
sequences if the Union army had decided in late 1862
that it had signed on to save the Union but not to free
the slaves and had resigned en masse because of dis-
agreement (which was extensive) with the Emancipa-
tion Proclamation. More recently, Air Force chief of
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staff Ronald Fogleman did not resign in protest in 1997, as many officers wish to
believe; he requested early retirement and left in such a manner—quietly, with-
out a full explanation—precisely so as not to confront his civilian superior over a
decision with which he deeply disagreed.96 All McMaster says (and believes), and
all that is proper in the American system, is that military officers should advise
honestly and forthrightly, or advocate in a confidential capacity, a course of ac-
tion. Whether their advice is heeded or not, if the policy or decision is legal, they
are to carry it out.
Resignation in protest directly assails civilian control. Issuing a public expla-
nation for resignation, however diplomatically couched, amounts to marshaling
all of an officer’s military knowledge, expertise, and experience—as well as the
profession’s standing with the public and reputation for disinterested patrio-
tism—to undercut some undertaking or concept that the officer opposes. The
fact that officers today either ignore or are oblivious to this basic aspect of their
professional ethics and would countenance, even admire, such truculent behav-
ior illustrates both a fundamental misunderstanding of civilian control and its
weakening as a primary professional value.97
Our military leaders have already traveled far in the direction of self-interested
bureaucratic behavior in the last half-century, to become advocates for policy
outcomes as opposed to advisers—presenting not only the military perspective
on a problem, or the needs of the military establishment and national defense, or
the interests of their services or branches, but their own views of foreign and
military policy—even, as we have seen, pressing these efforts outside the normal
advisory channels. Some of this is unthinking, some the product of civilian ab-
rogation of responsibility, and some is the unintended consequence of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, which so strengthened the chairman and the regional
commanders. But let us be clear: some is quite conscious. In his memoirs, Colin
Powell, the most celebrated soldier of the era, wrote that he learned as a White
House Fellow, from his most important mentor, that in the government “you
never know what you can get away with until you try.”98 Is that a proper standard
of professional behavior for a uniformed officer? He also declared that his gener-
ation of officers “vowed that when our turn came to call the shots, we would not
quietly acquiesce in halfhearted warfare for half-baked reasons that the Ameri-
can people could not understand or support.”99 Is that a proper view of military
subordination to civilian authority?
Unfortunately, General Powell’s views mirror attitudes that have become
widespread over the last generation. The survey of officer and civilian attitudes
and opinions undertaken by the Triangle Institute in 1998–99 discovered that
many officers believe that they have the duty to force their own views on civilian
decision makers when the United States is contemplating committing American
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forces abroad. When “asked whether . . . military leaders should be neutral, ad-
vise, advocate, or insist on having their way in . . . the decision process” to use
military force, 50 percent or more of the up-and-coming active-duty officers an-
swered “insist,” on the following issues: “setting rules of engagement, ensuring
that clear political and military goals exist . . . , developing an ‘exit strategy,’” and
“deciding what kinds of military units . . . will be used to accomplish all tasks.”100
In the context of the questionnaire, “insist” definitely implied that officers
should try to compel acceptance of the military’s recommendations.
In 2000, a three-star general casually referred to a uniformed culture in the Pen-
tagon that labels the Office of the Secretary of Defense as “the enemy”—because it
exercises civilian control.101 In 1999, staff officers of the National Security Coun-
cil deliberately attempted to promulgate a new version of the national security
strategy quickly enough to prevent the president from enunciating his own prin-
ciples first.102 In 1997 the chairman of the Joint Chiefs urged the chiefs to block
Congress’s effort to reform the military establishment through the Quadrennial
Defense Review.103 In the early 1990s, senior officers presented alternatives for
the use of American forces abroad specifically designed to discourage the civil-
ian leadership from intervening in the first place.104 Twice in the past five years
members of the Joint Chiefs have threatened to resign as a means of blocking a
policy or decision.105
Thus, in the last generation, the American military has slipped from conceiv-
ing of its primary role as advice to civilians followed by execution of their orders,
to trying—as something proper, even essential in some situations—to impose
its viewpoint on policies or decisions. In other words, American officers have,
over the course of the Cold War and in reaction to certain aspects of it, forgotten
or abandoned their historical stewardship of civilian control, their awareness of
the requirement to maintain it, and their understanding of the proper bound-
aries and behaviors that made it work properly and effectively. That so many
voices applaud this behavior or sanction it by their silence suggests that a new
definition of military professionalism may be forming, at least in civil-military
relations. If so, the consequences are not likely to benefit national security; they
could alter the character of American government itself.
Even military readers who accept my presentation of facts may find my concerns
overblown. Certainly, there is no crisis. The American military conceives of itself
as loyal and patriotic; it universally expresses support for civilian control as a
fundamental principle of government and of military professionalism. Yet at the
same time, the evidence is overwhelming that civil-military relationships have
deteriorated in the U.S. government. The underlying structures of civilian soci-
ety and the military profession that traditionally supported the system of
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civilian control have weakened. Over the course of the last generation, much in-
fluence and actual power has migrated to the military, which has either been al-
lowed to define, or has itself claimed, an expanded role in foreign policy and
national security decision making.106 The reasons are complex—partly circum-
stance, partly civilian inattention or politically motivated timidity. But a further
reason is that military leaders have either forgotten or chosen to ignore the basic
behaviors by which civil-military relations support military effectiveness and ci-
vilian control at the same time.
Whatever the causes, the conse-
quences are dangerous. Increased
military influence, combined
with the American people’s igno-
rance of or indifference to civilian
control and the misreading of the
bounds of professional behavior on the part of senior military officers, could in
the future produce a civil-military clash that damages American government or
compromises the nation’s defense.
That civilians in the executive and legislative branches of government over
the last generation bear ultimate responsibility for these developments is be-
yond doubt. Some on both sides seem to sense it. Secretaries of defense came
into office in 1989, 1993, and 2001 concerned about military subordination and
determined to exert their authority. Civilian officials have the obligation to
make the system work, not to abdicate for any reason. But to rely on the politi-
cians to restore the proper balance is to ignore the conditions and processes that
can frustrate civilian control. The historical record is not encouraging. Over two
centuries, the officials elected and appointed to rule the military have varied
enormously in knowledge, experience, understanding, and motivation. Their
propensity to exercise civilian control and to provide sound, forceful leadership
has been variable, largely situational, and unpredictable.107
Nor can the changes in American society and political understanding that
have weakened civilian control be easily reversed. National defense will capture
at best superficial public attention even during a war on terrorism, unless mili-
tary operations are ongoing or the government asks for special sacrifice. In war-
time, Americans want to rely more on military advice and authority, not less.
Over time, a smaller and smaller percentage of Americans are likely to perform
military service; without a conscious effort by the media to avoid caricaturing
military culture, and by colleges and universities to expand programs in military
history and security studies, future generations of civilian leaders will lack not
only the experience of military affairs but the comprehension of the subject
needed to make civilian control work effectively.
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A better way to alter the equation is for officers to recall the attitudes and reju-
venate the behaviors that civilian control requires. Certainly every officer sup-
ports the concept; every officer swears at commissioning “to support and defend
the Constitution of the United States” and to “bear true faith and allegiance” to
the same.108 Because civilian control pervades the Constitution, the oath is a per-
sonal promise to preserve, protect, defend, and support civilian control, in ac-
tual practice as well as in words. The requirement for such an oath was written
into the Constitution for precisely that purpose.109 Officers do not swear to strive
to maximize their services’ budgets, or to try to achieve certain policy outcomes,
or to attempt to reshape civilian life toward a military vision of the good society.
Individual officers at every level would do well to examine their personal
views of civilians, particularly of their clients: the American people, elected offi-
cials, and those appointed to exercise responsibility in national security affairs.
A certain amount of caution, skepticism, and perhaps even mistrust is healthy.
But contempt for clients destroys the professional relationship. Lawyers cannot
provide sound counsel, doctors effective treatment, ministers worthwhile sup-
port, teachers significant education—when they do not understand and respect
their clients. Military officers who feel contempt for their elected or appointed
supervisors, or the voters who placed them in office, are unlikely to advise them
wisely or carry out their policies effectively.
Officers should investigate their own professional views of civilian control. On
what do you base your thinking? Much of the problem I have discussed may stem
from the Cold War, or from one particular campaign of it, Vietnam, which contin-
ues to cast a long, if sometimes unnoticed, shadow. Are you positive that your
thinking about civil-military relations does not rest on the mistaken beliefs—and
they are mistaken—that the war was lost because of too much civilian control, or
that we succeeded so magnificently in the Persian Gulf in 1991 because the civil-
ians “[got] out of the way and let the military fight and win the war”?110 Neither of
those interpretations fit the facts of what happened in either war.111
Ponder whether you are prepared to accept, as a principle of civilian control,
that it includes the right of civilians to be wrong, to make mistakes—indeed, to
insist on making mistakes.112 This may be very hard to accept, given that people’s
lives, or the security of the nation, hang in the balance. But remember that the
military can be wrong, dead wrong, about military affairs—for after all, you are
not politicians, and as Carl von Clausewitz wrote long ago, war is an extension of
politics.113 Were you prepared to work for and with, and to accept, a Gore admin-
istration had the Democratic candidate won the 2000 election? If there is doubt
on your part, ponder the implications for civil-military relations and civilian
control. It is likely that within the next dozen years, there will be another
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Democratic administration. If the trend toward increasing friction and hostility
in civil-military relations during the last three—those of Johnson, Carter, and
Clinton—continues into the future, the national security of the United States
will not be well served.
Last of all, consider that if civilian control is to function effectively, the uni-
formed military will have not only to forswear or abstain from certain behavior
but actively encourage civilians to exercise their authority and perform their le-
gal and constitutional duty to make policy and decisions. You cannot and will
not solve those problems yourselves, nor is it your responsibility alone. Civilian
behavior and historical circumstances are just as much the causes of the present
problems in civil-military relations as any diminution of military professional-
ism. But you can help educate and develop civilian leaders in their roles and on
the processes of policy making, just as your predecessors did, by working with
them and helping them—without taking advantage of them, even when the op-
portunity arises. Proper professional behavior calls for a certain amount of ab-
stinence. What is being asked of you is no more or less than is asked of other
professionals who must subordinate their self-interest when serving their clients
and customers: lawyers to act against their self-interest and advise clients not to
press frivolous claims; doctors not to prescribe treatments that are unnecessary;
accountants to audit their clients’ financial statements fully and honestly; clergy-
men to refrain from exploiting the trust of parishioners or congregants.114 It will
be up to you to shape the relationship with your particular client, just as others do.
At its heart, the relationship involves civilian control in fact as well as form.
Civilian control ultimately must be considered in broad context. In the long his-
tory of human civilization, there have been military establishments that have fo-
cused on external defense—on protecting their societies—and those that have
preyed upon their own populations.115 The American military has never preyed
on this society. Yet democracy, as a widespread form of governance, is rather a
recent phenomenon, and our country has been fortunate to be perhaps the lead-
ing example for the rest of the world. For us, civilian control has been more a
matter of making certain the civilians control military affairs than of keeping
the military out of civilian politics. But if the United States is to teach civilian
control—professional military behavior—to countries overseas, its officers
must look hard at their own system and their own behavior at the same time.116
Our government must champion civilian control in all circumstances, with-
out hesitation. In April 2002 the United States acted with stupefying and
self-defeating hypocrisy when the White House initially expressed pleasure
at the apparent overthrow of President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela by that
country’s military, condoning an attempted coup while other nations in the
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hemisphere shunned the violation of democratic and constitutional pro-
cess.117 “No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise,” Winston Chur-
chill shrewdly observed in 1947. “Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the
worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried.”118
Churchill certainly knew the tensions involved in civil-military relations as well
as any democratic head of government in modern history. Both sides—civilian
and military—need to be conscious of these problems and to work to ameliorate
them.
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these capabilities at the expense of other pos-
sible employments.” This “wasn’t intended to
be a strategy for employing the forces—it was
meant to defend the size of the military.”
Clark, Waging Modern War, pp. 47, 36.
18. A brief analysis of these dilemmas is John F.
Lehman and Harvey Sicherman, “Demilita-
rizing the Military,” Foreign Policy Research
Institute Wire, July 1997. More extended
analyses are Gouré and Ranney, Averting the
Defense Train Wreck, chaps. 1–2; and Greider,
Fortress America, esp. pp. 28–9, 36–9, 42–5.
19. For recent indications of how electronics and
miniaturization, leading to greater accuracy
of weapons, faster acquisition of targets, and
more comprehensive networking of com-
puter systems, and the like, might be affecting
warfare and the armed services, see James
Kitfield, “The Permanent Frontier,” National
Journal, 17 March 2001, p. 780; Joseph
Fitchett, “Spying from Space: U.S. to Sharpen
the Focus,” International Herald Tribune, 10
April 2001, p. 1; Glenn W. Goodman, Jr.,
“Futuristic Army Vision: The Service’s Future
Combat System Is a True Leap-Ahead Pro-
gram,” Armed Forces Journal International,
May 2001, p. 26; James Ware, “Virtual De-
fense,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2001,
pp. 98–112; Nicholas Lemann, “Dreaming
about War,” The New Yorker, 16 July 2001,
pp. 32–8; Bill Owens [Adm., USN, Ret.] with
Ed Offley, Lifting the Fog of War (New York:
Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2000). An argument
for continuity, at least for ground warfare, is
Stephen Biddle, “Assessing Theories of Fu-
ture Warfare,” in The Use of Force after the
Cold War, ed. H. W. Brands (College Station:
Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2001), pp. 217–88.
For an overview, see Lawrence Freedman,
The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, Interna-
tional Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi
Paper 318 (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press,
1998).
20. Congress began pressing the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and Department of Defense to consider
the problem of overlapping roles and mis-
sions among the armed services as early as
1992. Congress formed a commission to ad-
dress those issues in 1995, pressed for a
broader Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
in 1997 (with a National Defense Panel to re-
view and critique the effort immediately af-
ter), another QDR in 2001, and in 1998 urged
the U.S. Commission on National Secu-
rity/21st Century, to take an “end to end,” or
more comprehensive, look at national secu-
rity and report in 2001. See Les Aspin, Report
on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, D.C.:
Office of the Secretary of Defense, October
1993), on the World Wide Web at http://
www.fas.org/man/docs/bur/index.html
(5 October 2000); Directions for Defense, Roles
and Missions Commission of the Armed Forces:
Report to Congress, the Secretary of Defense,
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
24 May 1995, executive summary, on the
World Wide Web at http://www.fas.org/
man/docs/corm95/di1062.html (26 Novem-
ber 2000); William S. Cohen, Report of the
Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, on the
World Wide Web at http://www.defenselink.mil/
pubs/qdr/index.html (26 November 2000);
Report of the National Defense Panel, De-
cember 1997, Transforming Defense: National
Security in the 21st Century, on the World
Wide Web at http://www.fas.org/man/
docs/ndp/toc.htm (links from this table of
contents) (2 August 2001); Road Map for Na-
tional Security: Imperative for Change: The
Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on
National Security/21st Century, March 15,
2001 (n.p. [Washington]: n.p. [U.S. Commis-
sion on National Security/21st Century],
2001); Background on the Quadrennial De-
fense Review May 1997, H.R. 3230, National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997,
Title IX, Subtitle B, Sec. 923, Quadrennial De-
fense Review—Force Structure Review, on the
World Wide Web at http://www.comw.org/
qdr/backgrd.html (26 November 2000). For
background, see Lorna S. Jaffe, The Develop-
ment of the Base Force (Washington, D.C.:
Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1993); National
Security Strategy of the United States (Wash-
ington, D.C.: White House, August 1991);
Colin Powell, Les Aspin, “DOD Bottom-Up
Review, September 1, 1993,” Defense Depart-
ment briefing, Federal Information Systems
Corporation, Federal News Service, ac-
cessed through Academic Universe, s.v. “Bot-
tom Up Review” (13 December 2000). For an
insider’s admission of paralysis on change
4 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
33
Kohn: Thr Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United Sta
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002
within the Pentagon and the failure of out-
side reform efforts, see Owens, Lifting the Fog
of War, pp. 32–42, 166–77, 207–19. Reveal-
ing reportage about the 1997 QDR is in
George Wilson, This War Really Matters:
Inside the Fight for Defense Dollars (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly
Press, 2000), chaps. 1–3.
21. As of 26 June 2001, some two-thirds of the
fifty major recommendations of the U.S.
Commission on National Security/21st Cen-
tury “were being acted upon in some fashion
by the Administration or Congress.” Memo-
randum, “Recommendations’ Status,” 26
June 2001, enclosed in Charles G. Boyd to the
author, 27 June 2001. The author was a mem-
ber of the national security study group sup-
porting the commission. The G. W. Bush
administration is at least rhetorically com-
mitted to change; see James Gerstenzang,
“Bush Offers New Vision of Military,” Los
Angeles Times, 12 December 2001, p. 1.
22. The battle over transforming defense policy
during the first months of the Bush adminis-
tration in 2001 was covered extensively in the
press. See, for example, reports by Thomas E.
Ricks, Washington Post, 20, 25 May; 22 June;
14, 19, 25 July; 3, 7, 18, 31 August; 9 Decem-
ber 2001; by Al Kamen, Washington Post, 16
May 2001. Also reports by Elaine Grossman,
Inside the Pentagon, 31 May; 14 June; 5, 19, 26
July; 17 August 2001; Stan Crock, Business
Week, 2 July, 6 August 2001; James Dao,
Thom Shanker, Thomas L. Friedman, New
York Times, 3 June; 11, 13, 14, 19, 26, 30
July; 18 August; 2 September 2001; James
Kitfield, Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., and George
C. Wilson, National Journal, 3 March, 9
June, 14 July, 3 November 2001; Bill Gertz,
Rowan Scarborough, Washington Times, 24
April; 25 May; 11, 29 June; 13 July; 30 Au-
gust 2001; Robert Holzer, Defense News,
4–10 June, 23–29 July 2001; Morton M.
Kondracke, Roll Call, 26 July 2001; Andrea
Stone, USA Today, 27 July 2001; by William
M. Arkin, washingtonpost.com, 4 June, 16
July 2001; by Pat Towell, Congressional Quar-
terly Weekly, 12 May, 21 July 2001; by
Eun-Kyung Kim, Lisa Burgess, European
Stars and Stripes, 24 May, 2 June 2001; by
Vago Muradian, Hunter Keeter, Defense
Daily International, 4 May 2001, and Defense
Daily, 11, 25 May 2001; and by Michael
Duffy, Time, 27 August 2001. Also, editorials
and opinion pieces in the Washington Post, 7
February, 27 August 2001; Weekly Standard,
14 May, 23 July 2001; Los Angeles Times, 24
May 2001; New York Times, 25 May, 13 July,
20 August 2001; Washington Times, 25 May,
10 June 2001; London Financial Times, 27
June, 31 July 2001; Wall Street Journal, 13
July; 1, 27 August 2001; USA Today, 18 July
2001; Boston Globe, 22 July 2001; U.S. News
and World Report, 13 August 2001; Milwau-
kee Journal Sentinel, 27, 28 August 2001; and
Newsweek, 3 September 2001. The first public
attacks on Rumsfeld’s efforts by the services
came in a widely disseminated e-mail from
former Army chief of staff Gordon Sullivan,
head of the Association of the U.S. Army, on
5 May and from active-duty and retired naval
officers defending aircraft carriers (Captain
William Toti in the Washington Times, 23
April 2001; the Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Vernon Clark, quoted in Inside the
Navy, 4 June 2001; retired admiral Leighton
W. Smith, Jr., in National Defense, June
2001). For an analysis of the institutional bar-
riers to change, see Thomas Mahnken,
“Transforming the U.S. Armed Forces: Rhet-
oric or Reality?” Naval War College Review,
Summer 2001, pp. 81–9. “If we could achieve
a 15 percent transformation in 10 years, I
would consider that reasonable,” Deputy Sec-
retary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz admitted in
August 2001; “I do not think there is going to
be a single decision that will not be opposed
by someone.” Tom Canahuate, “Total U.S.
Military Transformation in 10 Years Not Realis-
tic, Says Wolfowitz,” DefenseNews.com, 16 Au-
gust 2001. For the current direction of
“transformation,” see Wolfowitz, keynote ad-
dress, Fletcher Conference on “Focusing Na-
tional Power,” Washington, D.C., 14 November
2001, on the World Wide Web at http://
www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2001/s20011114-
depsecdef.html (1 December 2001).
23. See, for example, Paul Quinn-Judge, “Doubts
of Top Brass on the Use of Power Carry Great
Weight,” Boston Globe, 20 April 1994, p. 12;
Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Mil-
itary,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002,
pp. 20–32; Eliot A. Cohen, “A Tale of Two
Secretaries,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002,
pp. 33–46; and Elaine M. Grossman, “Re-
formers Unimpressed by Rumsfeld Plan to
K O H N 4 1
34
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 3, Art. 2
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss3/2
Overhaul Military Brass,” Inside the Pentagon,
18 April 2002, p. 1.
24. My understanding of the Kosovo air cam-
paign comes from Clark, Waging Modern
War; Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen,
eds., War over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy
in a Global Age (New York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 2001); Halberstam, War in a Time of
Peace, pp. 364ff.; Benjamin S. Lambeth,
NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and
Operational Assessment (Santa Monica, Ca-
lif.: RAND Corporation, 2001); Michael
Mandelbaum, “A Perfect Failure,” Foreign
Affairs, October 1999, pp. 2–8; and Daniel
L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman,
“Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate,”
and Barry R. Posen, “The War for Kosovo,”
both International Security, Spring 2000, pp.
5–84.
25. In 1998–99, the Triangle Institute for Security
Studies “Project on the Gap between the Mil-
itary and Civilian Society” compared the atti-
tudes, opinions, values, and perspectives of
elite officers on active duty and in the re-
serves with a sample of elite civilians in the
United States, and with the mass public. The
officer sample came from senior-year cadets
and midshipmen at the service academies and
in the Reserve Officers Training Corps, and
from officers selected for in-residence atten-
dance at staff and war colleges and for the
Capstone Course (for new flag officers) at
National Defense University, in Washington,
D.C. Comparable samples of reserve and Na-
tional Guard officers were also surveyed. The
elite civilian sample was a random selection
from Who’s Who in America and similar bio-
graphical compilations. The general-public
sample came from a telephone poll, using a
portion of the survey’s questions, conducted
by Princeton Survey Research Associates. In-
formation on the project and its methods can
be found at http://www.poli.duke.civmil and
in the introduction and conclusion in Peter
D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., Soldiers
and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and
American National Security (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 2001). The figures for mili-
tary officers cited in this essay do not include
students in precommissioning programs. In
the survey, 49 percent of the active-duty mili-
tary officers said they would leave military
service “if the senior uniformed leadership
does not stand up for what is right in military
policy.” This was the second most-listed
choice of nine offered, exceeded only by “if the
challenge and sense of fulfillment I derive
from my service were less” (68 percent). (All
percentages are rounded to the nearest whole
number.) For a sense of the bitterness in the
officer corps, particularly toward the senior
uniformed leadership, see “Chief of Staff of
the Army’s Leadership Survey: Command
and General Staff College Survey of 760 Mid-
Career Students (Majors with a Few LTCs),”
n.d. [Spring 2000], on the World Wide Web at
http://www.d-n-i.net/FCS_Folder/leadership_
comments.htm (30 November 2001); Ed
Offley, “Young Officers’ Anger, Frustration
Stun Navy’s Top Brass,” Seattle Post-Intelli-
gencer, 29 January 2000, on the World Wide
Web at http://seattlep-i.nwsource.com/lo-
cal/navy29.shtml (30 November 2001); Ro-
wan Scarborough, “Army Colonels Reject
Choice Assignments,” Washington Times, 1
November 2000, p. A1; Paul Richter, “Glam-
our of America’s Military Schools Fading for
Youth,” Los Angeles Times, 15 August 2000,
p. 16; Justin P. D. Wilcox [Cpt., USA], “Mili-
tary Experience Exposes ‘Readiness Lie,’”
USA Today, 5 September 2000, p. 26. Wilcox,
a West Pointer, was leaving the service after
five years because of underfunding, “more at-
tention placed on landscaping and details . . .
than on training,” because “pursuit of medi-
ocrity has become the norm,” and for other
reasons. “When,” he asked, “will a general of-
ficer finally lay his stars on the table and
stand up to the current administration for his
soldiers?” One of the earlier attacks on the se-
nior leadership was David H. Hackworth,
“Too Much Brass, Too Little Brash,” Atlanta
Constitution, 2 March 1994, p. 11. For survey
data and analysis, see American Military Cul-
ture in the Twenty-first Century: A Report of
the CSIS International Security Program
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 2000), pp. xxii, xxv,
17–8, 23–4, 45, 71–2. For an indication of a
slippage in quality, see David S. C. Chu and
John Brown, “Ensuring Quality People in De-
fense,” in Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense
for the Future, ed. Ashton B. Carter and John
P. White (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
2001), p. 206. These events followed the
downsizing of the armed services, which in the
Army officer corps damaged morale, loosened
4 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
35
Kohn: Thr Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United Sta
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002
organizational commitment, and undermined
professionalism. See David McCormick, The
Downsized Warrior: America’s Army in Transi-
tion (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1998),
chap. 4, esp. pp. 127–9.
26. I am indebted to Alfred Goldberg, historian
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense since
1973, for the insight about civilian control
being situational. I used this definition first in
“Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military
Relations,” National Interest, Spring 1994, pp.
16–7. A similar definition, emphasizing the
relative weight of military and civilian in de-
cisions and decision making, is found in Mi-
chael Desch, Civilian Control of the Military:
The Changing Security Environment (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1999), esp.
chaps. 1–3 and appendix. See also the discus-
sion in Yehuda Ben Meir, Civil-Military Rela-
tions in Israel (New York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 1995), chap. 2 (“Civilian Control”). In
an important forthcoming work on civil-mil-
itary relations, Peter Feaver distinguishes be-
tween trying to overthrow civilian authority
(as in a coup) and simply shirking in carrying
out the orders or wishes of the civilians. He
explores the latter in depth, interpreting mili-
tary subordination to civil authority as a vari-
able rather than a given. See his Armed
Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civilian Con-
trol (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press,
in press).
27. See James R. Locher III, “Has It Worked? The
Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act,” Naval
War College Review, Autumn 2001, pp. 108–9.
28. Pentagon reporter David Martin, in his
“Landing the Eagle,” Vanity Fair, November
1993, p. 153, described the Joint Staff this
way: “Made up of 1,400 men and women,
mostly in uniform, the Joint Staff analyzes the
military consequences of the various options
proposed by the administration. The answers
they come up with can stop a fledgling policy
dead in its tracks. You want to stop the
bloodshed in Bosnia? Sure, we can do it. But
it will take 500,000 troops and the second you
pull them out the fighting will resume.” For
an indication of the Joint Staff’s analytical
(and political) advantages over the Office of
the Secretary of Defense in the 2001 QDR, see
Elaine Grossman, “Shelton Mulls Holding
Key Civilian-Led Review to Exacting Stan-
dards,” Inside the Pentagon, 2 August 2001,
p. 1. See also James Kitfield, “Pentagon Power
Shift,” Government Executive, April 1994, p. 72.
29. Owens, Lifting the Fog of War, pp. 172–4;
John M. Shalikashvili et al., “Keeping the
Edge in Joint Operations,” in Keeping the
Edge, ed. Carter and White, pp. 39–42, 44–5;
Robert Holzer and Stephen C. LeSueur, “JCS
Quietly Gathers Up Reins of Power,” Defense
News, 13–19 June 1994.
30. Conversation with an officer at a war college,
June 1999. In late 2001, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld asked Congress’s permis-
sion to reduce the various legislative liaison
staffs in the Pentagon by almost half, to 250,
because, as he reportedly believed, “some
congressional liaison officers may be working
at cross purposes with the Bush administra-
tion’s plan by pushing their own agency or
command instead of the Pentagon’s top priori-
ties.” Rick Maze, “Senate Wants to Reduce
Number of Military Liaisons,” ArmyTimes.com,
4 December 2001.
31. Dana Priest, “The Proconsuls: Patrolling the
World,” in three front-page installments: “A
Four-Star Foreign Policy?” “An Engagement
in 10 Time Zones,” and “CINCs Don’t Swim
with State,” Washington Post, 28, 29, and 30
September 2000, respectively. See also the re-
marks of Dana Priest and Robert B. Oakley in
the State Department Open Forum, 23 March
2001, and U.S. Secretary of State, “Civil Mili-
tary Affairs and U.S. Diplomacy: The
Changing Roles of the Regional Com-
manders-in-Chief,” cable message to all dip-
lomatic and consular posts, 1 July 2001.
Writing from Paris, the journalist William
Pfaff had highlighted the change a year ear-
lier. “It is not too much to say that there is a
distinct foreign policy of military inspiration,
conducted from the Pentagon,” he wrote, cit-
ing the conflicting messages sent by the
American military to its Indonesian counter-
parts during the East Timor crisis. See “Be-
ware of a Military Penchant for a Parallel
Foreign Policy,” International Herald Tribune,
22 September 1999, on the World Wide Web at
http://www.iht.com/IHT/WP99/wp092299.html
(5 December 2001). For an indication of how
one regional commander actively sought to
determine policy and influence diplomacy, in
this case intervention to prevent ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo, see Clark, Waging War,
chaps. 5–6. Another regional commander,
K O H N 4 3
36
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 3, Art. 2
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss3/2
Marine Corps general Anthony Zinni of U.S.
Central Command, described himself as a
“proconsul,” hinting an analogy with a post
in the ancient Roman republic and empire
that mixed enormous political, military, and
judicial powers over the population of a
province. This author may have been the first
to suggest that label to General Zinni, in an
exchange at U.S. Central Command head-
quarters, Tampa, Florida, April 1998.
32. Andrew J. Bacevich, “Discord Still: Clinton
and the Military,” Washington Post, 3 January
1999, p. C01.
33. See the sources in note 22 above. An insight-
ful summation is Michael Duffy, “Rumsfeld:
Older but Wiser?” Time, 27 August 2001,
pp. 22–7.
34. Wilson, This War Really Matters, takes a de-
tailed, and particularly revealing, look at the
“decision-making process for national de-
fense” (p. 3) for the 1997–99 period, espe-
cially the interactions between the civilians in
the executive branch, the Congress, and the
Joint Chiefs. To understand the extent to
which the armed services are expected to
press their own institutional interests with
Congress, see Stephen K. Scroggs, Army Rela-
tions with Congress: Thick Armor, Dull Sword,
Slow Horse (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2000).
35. Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt: General Creighton
Abrams and the Army of His Times (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), pp. 361–4;
Herbert Y. Schandler, The Unmaking of a
President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press,
1977), pp. 39, 56, 103, 305; and Eric Q.
Winograd, “Officials: Homeland Defense
Mission Will Mean Changes for the Guard,”
Inside the Army, 19 November 2001, p. 1.
James Schlesinger, the secretary of defense
who must have approved this change in force
structure, confirmed this interpretation in the
very process of questioning it: “This would
not really be like Abe [Abrams]. He had the
view that the military must defer to the civil-
ians, even to an extraordinary degree. I spec-
ulate that the military sought to fix the
incentives so that the civilians would act ap-
propriately.” Quoted in Duncan, Citizen
Warriors, pp. 271–2.
36. William J. Crowe, Jr. [Adm., USN], The Line
of Fire: From Washington to the Gulf, the
Politics and Battles of the New Military (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), pp. 41, 127,
152–9, 161, 177, 180–5, 189–90, 212–41,
304–5, 309, 312–9, 341–5; Bob Woodward,
The Commanders (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1991), p. 40.
37. See, for example, Barton Gellman, “Rum-
blings of Discord Heard in Pentagon,” Wash-
ington Post, 20 June 1993, p. A1.
38. J. G. Prout III, memorandum for the Com-
mander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, “Subj:
CNO Comments at Surface Warfare Flag Of-
ficer Conference (SWFOC),” 23 September
1994, copy in possession of the author.
39. Directions for Defense; Robert Holzer, “Ex-
perts: Streamlined Staff at OSD Could Save
Billions,” Defense News, 2–8 December 1996,
p. 28.
40. For insight into the military’s influence over
the character of the intervention in Bosnia,
see Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The
Making of America’s Bosnia Policy (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000),
pp. 140–53, 173–8; Dan Blumenthal,
“Clinton, the Military, and Bosnia,
1993–1995: A Study in Dysfunctional Civil
Military Relations,” Soldiers, Statesmen, and
the Use of Force Seminar, Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies,
Washington, D.C., 7 June 1999; and Clark,
Waging War, pp. 55–66, 73, 79–80. Clark,
who was the senior U.S. military adviser at
the Dayton negotiations, put it this way
(p. 59): “Under our agreement, we were seek-
ing to limit the obligations of the military . . .
but to give the commander unlimited author-
ity to accomplish these limited obligations.”
A background analysis is Susan L. Wood-
ward, “Upside-Down Policy: The U.S. Debate
on the Use of Force and the Case of Bosnia,”
in Use of Force, ed. Brands, pp. 111–34. In an
analysis of civil-military conflicts between
1938 and 1997, Michael C. Desch argues that
civilian control weakened in the United States
during the 1990s. He finds that civilians pre-
vailed in fifty-nine of sixty-two instances of
civil-military conflict before the 1990s but in
only five of twelve in that decade. See his Ci-
vilian Control of the Military, chap. 3 and
appendix.
41. Charles G. Boyd, “America Prolongs the War
in Bosnia,” New York Times, 9 August 1995,
4 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
37
Kohn: Thr Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United Sta
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002
p. 19, and “Making Peace with the Guilty:
The Truth about Bosnia,” Foreign Affairs, Oc-
tober 1995, pp. 22–38. The op-ed began,
“Having spent the last two years as deputy
commander of the U.S. European Command,
I have found that my views on the frustrating
events in Bosnia differ from much of the con-
ventional wisdom in Washington.”
42. Bill Keller, “The World according to Powell,”
New York Times Magazine, 25 November
2001, p. 65.
43. For a fuller discussion of General Powell’s ef-
forts to circumvent civilian control, see
Kohn, “Out of Control,” pp. 8–13, and with
Powell’s reply, comments by John Lehman,
William Odom, and Samuel P. Huntington,
and my response in National Interest, Sum-
mer 1994, pp. 23–31. Other profiles and sup-
porting material are in Jon Meacham, “How
Colin Powell Plays the Game,” Washington
Monthly, December 1994, pp. 33–42; Charles
Lane, “The Legend of Colin Powell,” New Re-
public, 17 April 1995, pp. 20–32; Michael R.
Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, “Beltway
Warrior,” New York Times Magazine, 27 Au-
gust 1995, pp. 40–3; Keller, “World according
to Powell,” pp. 61ff.; Michael C. Desch and
Sharon K. Weiner, eds., Colin Powell as JCS
Chairman: A Panel Discussion on American
Civil-Military Relations, October 23, 1995,
Project on U.S. Post–Cold War Civil-Military
Relations, Working Paper 1 (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University, John M. Olin In-
stitute for Strategic Studies, December 1995);
Lawrence F. Kaplan, “Yesterday’s Man: Colin
Powell’s Out-of-Date Foreign Policy,” New
Republic, 1 January 2001, pp. 17–21.
44. Eric Schmitt and Elaine Sciolino, “To Run
Pentagon, Bush Sought Proven Manager with
Muscle,” New York Times, 1 January 2001,
p. 1; Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “In-
side the Ring,” Washington Times, 26 January
2001, p. A9. Significantly, Powell’s close friend
Richard Armitage, who had been mentioned
frequently for the position of deputy secretary
of defense, was not offered that position and
instead became deputy secretary of state.
45. T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals
(New York: Random House, 1952), remains
indispensable. See also Richard N. Current,
The Lincoln Nobody Knows (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1958), p. 169; David Herbert
Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1995), pp. 386–8; and Bruce Tap,
Over Lincoln’s Shoulder: The Committee on
the Conduct of the War (Lawrence: Univ.
Press of Kansas, 1998), pp. 151–4.
46. Timothy D. Johnson, Winfield Scott: The
Quest for Military Glory (Lawrence: Univ.
Press of Kansas, 1998), pp. 217–9; John E.
Marszalek, Sherman: A Soldier’s Passion for
Order (New York: Free Press, 1993),
pp. 386–9.
47. Mark Russell Shulman, Navalism and the
Emergence of American Sea Power, 1882–1893
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995),
pp. 46–57, 152–3; Paul A. C. Koistinen, Mobi-
lizing for Modern War: The Political Economy
of American Warfare, 1865–1919 (Lawrence:
Univ. Press of Kansas, 1997), pp. 48–57;
Benjamin Franklin Cooling, Gray Steel and
Blue Water Navy: The Formative Years of
America’s Military-Industrial Complex,
1881–1917 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books,
1979), chaps. 3–4, postscript. See also Kurt
Hackemer, The U.S. Navy and the Origins of
the Military-Industrial Complex, 1847–1883
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001),
and his “Building the Military-Industrial Re-
lationship: The U.S. Navy and American
Business, 1854–1883,” Naval War College Re-
view, Spring 1999, pp. 89–111.
48. DeWitt S. Copp, A Few Great Captains: The
Men and Events That Shaped the Development
of U.S. Air Power (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1980); David E. Johnson, Fast
Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the
U.S. Army, 1917–1945 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
Univ. Press, 1998), pp. 66–9, 81–4, 86–90,
102–3, 158–60, 220–2, 227–8; Randall R.
Rice, “The Politics of Air Power: From Con-
frontation to Cooperation in Army Aviation
Civil-Military Relations, 1919–1940” (disser-
tation, University of North Carolina at Cha-
pel Hill, 2002).
49. Quoted in Marriner Eccles, Beckoning Fron-
tiers: Public and Personal Recollections, ed.
Sidney Hyman (New York: Knopf, 1951),
p. 336. For a sense of Theodore Roosevelt’s
troubles with the services, see his letters to
Elihu Root, 7 March 1902; to Oswald Garri-
son Villard, 22 March 1902; to Leonard
Wood, 4 June 1904; and to Truman H.
Newberry, 28 August 1908, quoted in Elting
E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roo-
sevelt, 8 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
K O H N 4 5
38
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 3, Art. 2
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss3/2
Univ. Press, 1951–54), vol. 3, pp. 241, 247;
vol. 4, p. 820; vol. 6, p. 1199. See also the
forthcoming study of Roosevelt as com-
mander in chief by Matthew M. Oyos, who
supplied excerpts from the above documents;
and Oyos, “Theodore Roosevelt, Congress,
and the Military: U.S. Civil-Military Relations
in the Early Twentieth Century,” Presidential
Studies Quarterly, vol. 30, 2000, pp. 312–30.
50. The civil-military battles of the 1940s, 1950s,
and 1960s are covered in a number of works,
among them: Demetrios Caraley, The Politics
of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and
the Policy Process (New York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 1966); Herman S. Wolk, The Struggle
for Air Force Independence, 1943–1947 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums
Program, 1997); Jeffrey G. Barlow, Revolt of
the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation,
1945–1950 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Histori-
cal Center, 1994); Steven L. Rearden, The
Formative Years, 1947–1950, vol. 1 of History
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, 1984); Robert L. Wat-
son, Into the Missile Age, 1956–1960, vol. 4 of
History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office
of the Secretary of Defense, 1997); Andrew J.
Bacevich, “Generals versus the President: Ei-
senhower and the Army, 1953–1955,” in Se-
curity in a Changing World: Case Studies in
U.S. National Security Management, ed.
Volker C. Franke (Westport, Conn.: Praeger,
2002), pp. 83–99; and Deborah Shapley,
Promise and Power: The Life and Times of
Robert McNamara (Boston: Little, Brown,
1993).
51. For a brief history of civilian control, see
Richard H. Kohn, “Civil-Military Relations:
Civilian Control of the Military,” in The Ox-
ford Companion to American Military History,
ed. John Whiteclay Chambers II (New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1999), pp. 122–5. Similar
interpretations of the conflict inherent in the
relationship are Russell F. Weigley, “The
American Military and the Principle of Civil-
ian Control from McClellan to Powell,” Jour-
nal of Military History, special issue, vol. 57,
1993, pp. 27–59; Russell F. Weigley, “The
American Civil-Military Cultural Gap: A His-
torical Perspective, Colonial Times to the
Present,” in Soldiers and Civilians, ed. Feaver
and Kohn, chap. 5; Ronald H. Spector, “Op-
eration Who Says: Tension between Civilian
and Military Leaders Is Inevitable,” Washing-
ton Post, 22 August 1999, p. B1; and Peter D.
Feaver, “Discord and Divisions of Labor: The
Evolution of Civil-Military Conflict in the
United States,” paper presented at the annual
meeting of the American Political Science As-
sociation, Washington, D.C., 1993. A particu-
larly cogent analysis from a generation ago,
by a scholar who both studied the issues and
participated as a senior civilian official in the
Pentagon, is Adam Yarmolinsky, “Civilian
Control: New Perspectives for New Prob-
lems,” Indiana Law Journal, vol. 49, 1974,
pp. 654–71.
52. See, for example, Dana Priest, “Mine Deci-
sion Boosts Clinton-Military Relations,”
Washington Post, 21 September 1997, p. A22;
Ernest Blazar, “Inside the Ring,” Washington
Times, 8 June 1998, p. 11; Jonathan S.
Landay, “U.S. Losing Handle on Its Diplo-
macy in a Kosovo ‘at War,’” Christian Science
Monitor, 5 June 1998, p. 7; Daniel Rearick,
“An Unfortunate Opposition: U.S. Policy to-
ward the Establishment of the International
Criminal Court” (honors thesis, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2000).
53. In The Clustered World: How We Live, What
We Buy, and What It All Means about Who
We Are (Boston: Little, Brown, 2000), a study
of consumerism and lifestyles, Michael J.
Weiss identifies the military as one of
“sixty-two distinct population groups each
with its own set of values, culture and means
of coping with today’s problems” (p. 11). His
thesis is that the country has become splint-
ered and fragmented (see pp. 258–9 and
chap. 1). For the military’s “presence” in
American society, see the late Adam
Yarmolinsky’s comprehensive The Military
Establishment: Its Impacts on American Society
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971), and
James Burk, “The Military’s Presence in
American Society,” in Soldiers and Civilians,
ed. Feaver and Kohn, chap. 6. In 1985, “a
group of 31 military and veterans organiza-
tions that lobby for the uniformed services on
personnel and pay issues” representing some
“6 million veterans and their families”
banded together to form the “Military Coali-
tion,” a force that in the opinion of one
thoughtful retired general is “potentially far
4 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
39
Kohn: Thr Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United Sta
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002
more numerous and powerful than the
NRA!!!” Stephen Barr, “Military Pay Expert
Retires,” Washington Post, 12 March 2001,
p. B2; Ted Metaxis e-mail to the author, 24
October 1999.
54. Donald Rumsfeld, “Rumsfeld’s Rules,” rev.
ed., January 17, 2001, on the World Wide Web
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/jan2001/
rumsfeldsrules.pdf (29 January 2001).
55. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense
Review Report, 30 September 2001, on the
World Wide Web at http://www.defenselink.mil/
pubs/qdr2001.pdf (6 October 2001); Anne
Plummer, “Pentagon Launches Some 50 Re-
views in Major Defense Planning Effort,” In-
side the Pentagon, 15 November 2001, p. 1;
John Liang, “Rumsfeld Supports Switching
Future QDRs to Administration’s Second
Year,” InsideDefense.com, 6 December 2001.
56. Thomas E. Ricks, “Target Approval Delays
Cost Air Force Key Hits,” Washington Post,
18 November 2001, p. 1, and “Rumsfeld’s
Hands-On War: Afghan Campaign Shaped
by Secretary’s Views, Personality,” Washing-
ton Post, 19 December 2001, p. 1; Esther
Schrader, “Action Role a Better Fit for
Rumsfeld,” Los Angeles Times, 11 November
2001, p. 22; Lawrence F. Kaplan, “Ours to
Lose: Why Is Bush Repeating Clinton’s Mis-
takes?” New Republic, 12 November 2001,
pp. 25–6; Robert Kagan and William Kristol,
“Getting Serious,” Weekly Standard, 19 No-
vember 2001, pp. 7–8; J. Michael Waller,
“Rumsfeld: Plagues of Biblical Job,” Insight
Magazine, 10 December 2001; Damian
Whitworth and Roland Watson, “Rumsfeld
at Odds with His Generals,” London Times,
16 October 2001, p. 5; Toby Harnden,
“Rumsfeld Calls for End to Old Tactics of
War,” London Daily Telegraph, 16 October
2001, p. 8.
57. Quoted in Donald Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior:
The Early Life of John J. Pershing (New York:
Scribner’s, 1973), p. 278.
58. Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New
York: Henry Holt, 1951), p. 147. For an out-
line of the four factors underlying civilian
control in the United States historically, see
my “Civilian Control of the Military,”
pp. 122–5.
59. The Gallup polling organization has surveyed
Americans annually on their confidence in
major institutions since the early 1970s, and
the military has topped the list since 1987,
with over 60 percent expressing a “great deal”
or “quite a lot” of confidence. See Frank
Newport, “Military Retains Top Position in
Americans’ Confidence Ratings,” 25 June
2001, on the World Wide Web at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/
pr010625.asp (2 December 2001) and “Small
Business and Military Generate Most Confi-
dence in Americans,” 15 August 1997, on the
World Wide Web at http://www.gallup.com/
poll/releases/ pr970815.asp (2 December
2001); “Gallup Poll Topics: A-Z: Confidence
in Institutions,” 8–10 June 2001, on the
World Wide Web at http://www.gallup.com/
poll/indicators/indconfidence.asp (2 Decem-
ber 2001). For excellent analyses of the
change in public attitudes toward the military
since the late 1960s, see David C. King and
Zachary Karabell, “The Generation of Trust:
Public Confidence in the U.S. Military since
Vietnam,” revision of a paper presented to
the Duke University political science depart-
ment, 29 January 1999, to be published in
2002 by the American Enterprise Institute;
and Richard Sobel, “The Authoritarian Reflex
and Public Support for the U.S. Military: An
Anomaly?” paper presented at the annual
meeting of the Midwest Political Science As-
sociation, 16 April 1999. Respect for lawyers
is low and has been declining in recent years.
See Darren K. Carlson, “Nurses Remain at
Top of Honest and Ethics Poll,” 27 Novem-
ber 2000, on the World Wide Web at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/
Pr001127.asp (2 December 2001).
60. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Philip D. Zelikow, and Da-
vid C. King, eds., Why People Don’t Trust
Government (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1997); Albert H. Cantril and Su-
san Davis Cantril, Reading Mixed Signals:
Ambivalence in American Public Opinion
about Government (Washington, D.C.:
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999). The
decline in trust of government and confi-
dence in public institutions has not been lim-
ited to the United States. See Susan J. Pharr
and Robert D. Putnam, eds., Disaffected De-
mocracies: What’s Troubling the Trilateral
Countries? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ.
Press, 2000). Trust in government in the
United States after the 11 September attacks
jumped dramatically to the highest level since
K O H N 4 7
40
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 3, Art. 2
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss3/2
1968. Frank Newport, “Trust in Government
Increases Sharply in Wake of Terrorist At-
tacks,” 12 October 2001, on the World Wide
Web at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/
pr011012.asp (2 December 2001); Alexander
Stille, “Suddenly, Americans Trust Uncle
Sam,” New York Times, 3 November, p. A11;
and John D. Donahue, “Is Government the
Good Guy?” New York Times, 13 December
2001, p. A31. Whether the attacks will reverse
the long-term trend remains to be seen.
61. For critiques of journalism in general and
coverage of the military in particular, see Bill
Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel, Warp Speed:
America in the Age of Mixed Media (New
York: Century Foundation Press, 1999); Scott
Shuger, “First, the Bad News: The Big Daily
Newspapers Get Some Things Right. National
Defense Isn’t One of Them,” Mother Jones,
September/October 1998, pp. 72–6. My views
come from a decade of close reading of re-
porting on national security issues. An exam-
ple of lack of interest in civil-military
relations is the absence in the media of reac-
tion to and interpretation of the detailed and
persuasive reports of Dana Priest (see note 31
above) about the growth in power of the re-
gional commanders, discussed previously.
Typical of press misunderstanding is the edi-
torial “Unifying Armed Forces Requires Rad-
ical Change” in the 18 June 2001 Honolulu
Star-Bulletin, calling for abolition of the sepa-
rate military departments, replacement of the
JCS by a “single Chief of Military Staff who
would command the armed forces,” and fur-
ther empowerment of the regional com-
manders. The editorial purports to “make the
Secretary of Defense a genuine master of the
Pentagon rather than a referee among war-
ring factions,” but the recommendations
would destroy a secretary’s ability to monitor
and supervise one of the world’s largest, and
most complex, bureaucratic structures.
62. See William J. Bennett, The Index of Leading
Cultural Indicators: American Society at the
End of the Twentieth Century, updated and
expanded ed. (New York: Broadway Books,
1999); Marc Miringoff and Marque-Luisa
Miringoff, The Social Health of the Nation:
How America Is Really Doing (New York: Ox-
ford Univ. Press, 1999); James H. Billington,
“The Human Consequences of the Informa-
tion Revolution,” Ditchley Foundation
Lecture 37 (Chipping Norton, U.K.: Ditchley
Foundation, 2000); Robert D. Putnam,
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of
American Community (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 2000); Everett Carl Ladd, The Ladd
Report (New York: Free Press, 1999); Weiss,
The Clustered World, pp. 10–1, 14–5, 19–25,
43–4; Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina,
eds., Civic Engagement in American Democ-
racy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution
Press, 1999), essays 1, 12, 13; Derek Bok, The
Trouble with Government (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Univ. Press, 2001), pp. 386–98; Wil-
liam Chaloupka, Everybody Knows: Cynicism
in America (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota
Press, 1999); Robert D. Kaplan, An Empire
Wilderness: Travels into America’s Future
(New York: Random House, 1998); and
Adam B. Seligman, The Problem of Trust
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press,
1997). More hopeful though still cautious
pictures are Robert William Fogel, The Fourth
Great Awakening & the Future of Egalitarian-
ism (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2000);
and Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption:
Human Nature and the Reconstitution of So-
cial Order (New York: Free Press, 1999).
63. In the TISS survey, a number of the
250-some questions examined attitudes
about the proper role of the military in soci-
ety. For example, 49 percent of elite civilians
and 68 percent of the mass public agreed
(“strongly” or “somewhat”) that “in wartime,
civilian government leaders should let the
military take over running the war,” a posi-
tion echoed by even as distinguished a
scholar as Amitai Etzioni (“How Not to Win
the War,” USA Today, 7 November 2001,
p. 15). To the question, “Members of the mil-
itary should be allowed to publicly express
their political views just like any other citi-
zen,” 59 percent of the civilian elite and 84
percent of the general public agreed. Civilians
were much more likely than the military to
condone leaking documents to the press in
various situations. The distinguished sociolo-
gist James A. Davis felt the results “make
one’s hair stand on end” but suggested as a
“simple explanation” that they are accounted
for by “cynicism about civilian politics,”
Americans’ high regard for “their military,”
and by the ideas that civilian control is “a
fairly sophisticated doctrine, while common
sense suggests that important decisions
4 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
41
Kohn: Thr Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United Sta
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002
should be made by people who are best in-
formed.” See his “Attitudes and Opinions
among Senior Military Officers and a U.S.
Cross-Section, 1998–1999,” in Soldiers and
Civilians, ed. Feaver and Kohn, p. 120 and
esp. table 2.10. My point is that whatever the
explanation, the very positive image of the
military held by Americans in the last dozen
or so years diverges considerably from what
seems to have been the historical norm. See
C. Robert Kemble, The Image of the Army Of-
ficer in America: Background for Current
Views (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1973);
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the
State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military
Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ.
Press, 1957), particularly part 2. At the same
time, 47 percent of the general public did not
think “civilian control of the military is abso-
lutely safe and secure in the United States,”
and 68 percent thought that “if civilian lead-
ers order the military to do something that it
opposes, military leaders will seek ways to
avoid carrying out the order” at least “some
of the time” (30 percent thought “all” or
“most of the time”). For the decline in civics
education and understanding, see Chris
Hedges, “35% of High School Seniors Fail
National Civics Test,” New York Times, 21
November 1999, p. 17; Bok, Trouble with
Government, pp. 403–6.
64. For the caricatures in popular literature and
films, see Howard Harper, “The Military and
Society: Reaching and Reflecting Audiences in
Fiction and Film,” Armed Forces & Society, vol.
27, 2001, pp. 231–48. Charles C. Moskos, “To-
ward a Postmodern Military: The United
States as a Paradigm,” in The Postmodern Mili-
tary: Armed Forces after the Cold War, ed.
Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and
David R. Segal (New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
2000), p. 20; Moskos, “What Ails the All-
Volunteer Force: An Institutional Perspective,”
Parameters, Summer 2001, pp. 34–5; and “In-
terview: James Webb,” U.S. Naval Institute Pro-
ceedings, April 2000, pp. 78–9, all argue that the
military is pictured negatively in film. But King
and Karabell, “Generation of Trust,” pp. 6–7,
judge that current portrayals are the most
“positive . . . since World War II.”
65. Gary Hart, The Minuteman: Restoring an
Army of the People (New York: Free Press,
1998), particularly chaps. 1, 3.
66. In the TISS survey of “elite” officers, some 40
percent of the National Guard and 25 percent
of the reserve respondents listed their occu-
pation as “military,” which suggests that they
are in uniform full-time or work somewhere
in national defense, either for government or
industry. See David Paul Filer, “Military Re-
serves: Bridging the Culture Gap between Ci-
vilian Society and the United States Military”
(M.A. thesis, Duke University, Durham,
North Carolina, 2001), pp. 46–7. In the fiscal
year 2001 defense authorization act, 6.6 per-
cent of the Army National Guard and 20.6
percent of the Air National Guard were au-
thorized to be “dual status” civilian techni-
cians and uniformed members. Charlie Price
(National Guard Bureau of Public Affairs)
e-mail to author, 12 February 2001.
67. The similarity “attitudinally” between active-
duty officers and the National Guard and re-
serves on some of the questions in the TISS sur-
vey is addressed in Filer, “Military Reserves.”
Other congruence is evident in the data.
68. See, for example, Jack Kelly, “U.S. Reliance
on Guards, Reservists Escalating,” Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette, 28 October 2000, p. 9; Steven
Lee Myers, “Army Will Give National Guard
the Entire U.S. Role in Bosnia,” New York
Times, 5 December 2000, p. A8; Winograd,
“Officials: Homeland Defense Mission Will
Mean Changes for the Guard,” p. 1; David T.
Fautua, “Army Citizen-Soldiers: Active,
Guard, and Reserve Leaders Remain Silent
about Overuse of Reserve Components,”
Armed Forces Journal International, Septem-
ber 2000, pp. 72–4; John J. Miller, “Unre-
served: The Misuse of America’s Reserve
Forces,” National Review, 23 July 2001,
pp. 26ff.; and Duncan, Citizen Warriors,
pp. 214–7 and n. 25. Duncan calls the 1995
deployment of Guardsmen and reserves to
the Sinai for six months of peacekeeping duty
“unprecedented.” See also Peter Bacqué,
“Guard Troops Will Head for Sinai in ’95,”
Richmond Times-Dispatch, 28 January 1994,
p. B6. The reserve-component contribution
to active-duty missions has risen from about
one million man-days in 1986 to approxi-
mately thirteen million in each of the years
1996, 1997, and 1998. CSIS, American Mili-
tary Culture, p. 19. See also Conrad C. Crane,
Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Mis-
sions in Smaller-Scale Contingencies during the
K O H N 4 9
42
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 3, Art. 2
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss3/2
1990s (Carlisle, Penna.: U.S. Army Strategic
Studies Institute, January 2001), pp. 29–30.
69. Personal exchange, panel discussion on
civil-military relations, Marine Corps Staff
College, Quantico, Virginia, September
1998; personal exchange, lecture/discussion
with twenty-six state adjutant generals, U.S.
Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania,
October 1998.
70. The decline in citizen-soldiering and some
of its implications are addressed in Andrew
J. Bacevich, “Losing Private Ryan: Why the
Citizen-Soldier Is MIA,” National Review, 9
August 1999, pp. 32–4. Also Elliott Abrams
and Andrew J. Bacevich, “A Symposium on
Citizenship and Military Service”; Eliot A.
Cohen, “Twilight of the Citizen-Soldier”;
and James Burk, “The Military Obligation of
Citizens since Vietnam”; all Parameters,
Summer 2001, pp. 18–20, 23–8, 48–60, re-
spectively. Also Hart, Minuteman, esp.
pp. 16–7, 21–5. For a recent review of the end
of conscription, see David R. Sands, “Military
Draft Now Part of Past: Spain and Italy are
the Latest European Nations to Abandon
Compulsory Service,” and “U.S. Talk of a
Draft Probably Hot Air,” Washington Times,
31 December 2000, pp. 1, 4, respectively.
71. In the TISS survey, well over 90 percent of
the civilian elite said that the people they
came into contact with “in the social or com-
munity groups to which [they] belong” were
either “all civilians” or “mostly civilians with
some military.” The same was true (over 90
percent of respondents) in the workplace.
Americans (both elite and general public)
who have not served in the military also have
fewer close friends who now serve or are vet-
erans. The prospects for diminished civilian
contact with, understanding of, and support
for the military are analyzed in Paul Gronke
and Peter D. Feaver, “Uncertain Confidence:
Civilian and Military Attitudes about
Civil-Military Relations,” in Soldiers and Civil-
ians, ed. Feaver and Kohn, chap. 3. Congress-
man Ike Skelton, ranking Democrat on the
House Armed Services Committee, had al-
ready discerned the trend and its implications
for support of the military; see Rasheeda
Crayton, “Skelton Calls for More Military
Support,” Kansas City Star, 12 November
1997, p. 15. A more general comment comes
from Brent Scowcroft, national security
adviser to Presidents Gerald Ford and George
H. W. Bush: “With the lessened contact be-
tween the American people and the military,
. . . the results will not be healthy.”
Scowcroft, “Judgment and Experience:
George Bush’s Foreign Policy,” in Presidential
Judgment: Foreign Policy Decision Making in
the White House, ed. Aaron Lobel (Hollis,
N.H.: Hollis, 2001), 115. The declining pro-
pensity of youth to serve is noted in Thomas
W. Lippman, “With a Draft Cut Off, Nation’s
Society Climate Changed Sharply,” Washing-
ton Post, 8 September 1998, p. 13. Lippman
cites Pentagon “Youth Attitude Tracking Sur-
vey” figures indicating that some 32 percent
of youth “expressed some desire to join the
military” in 1973, the last year of the Cold
War draft, but that by 1993 the figure had
dropped to 25 percent and by 1997 to 12 per-
cent. See also Moskos, “What Ails the
All-Volunteer Force,” pp. 39–41.
72. William T. Bianco and Jamie Markham,
“Vanishing Veterans: The Decline of Military
Experience in the U.S. Congress,” in Soldiers
and Civilians, ed. Feaver and Kohn, chap. 7.
73. Norman Ornstein, “The Legacy of Campaign
2000,” Washington Quarterly, Spring 2001, p.
102; William M. Welch, “Most U.S. Law-
makers Lack Combat Experience,” USA To-
day, 12 November 2001, p. 12. Writing before
11 September, Ornstein calls the present
“Congress . . . clearly and irrevocably a
post–Cold War Congress. Eighty-three per-
cent, or 363 members, of the House were first
elected in the 1990s, since the Berlin Wall fell,
along with 57 members of the Senate. Few of
these lawmakers, in either party, have an abid-
ing interest in the U.S. role in the world. Inter-
national issues are simply not high on their
priority list.” He notes also that in a typical
post–World War II Congress, some
three-quarters of the senators and more than
half the representatives were veterans. Impor-
tantly, the newer veterans in Congress are
quite likely to be Republicans, whereas in the
past veterans were more or less evenly split.
Donald N. Zillman, “Maintaining the Political
Neutrality of the Military,” IUS [Inter-University
Seminar on Armed Forces and Society] News-
letter, Spring 2001, p. 17. In 2000, a retired rear
admiral “started a ‘National Defense
P[olitical]A[ction]C[ommittee]’ to support
congressional candidates who have served in
5 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
43
Kohn: Thr Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United Sta
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002
the armed forces.” “Inside Washington, D.C.:
G.I. Joes and G.I. Janes Ready Their PAC,”
National Journal, 9 September 2000, p. 2759.
74. According to the newsletter of the Federal
Voting Assistance Program, the military be-
gan voting in greater percentages than the
public in 1984, and in 1996 “at an overall rate
of 64%, compared to the 49% rate generated
by the general public. The Uniformed Ser-
vices’ high participation rate can be directly
attributed to the active voter assistance pro-
grams conducted by Service Commanders
and to assistance from the state and local
election officials in simplifying the absentee
voting process and accommodating the spe-
cial needs of the Uniformed Services.” See
“Military Retains High Participation Rates,”
Voting Information News, July 1997, p. 1. In
the 1980 election, military voting was below
civilian (49.7 to 52.6 percent). In the 1992
election, the Defense Department expanded
the program, according to a reporter, “to reg-
ister and turn out military voters,” changing
the “emphasis . . . from ensuring availability of
voting forms to mustering ballots at the polls.”
Setting “for the first time . . . a target rate for
participation,” this “new focus on voter turn-
out . . . has led some Democratic and some in-
dependent analysts to suspect the Bush
administration is trying to energize a predict-
ably sympathetic voter base.” Barton Gellman,
“Pentagon Intensifies Effort to Muster Military
Voters,” Washington Post, 17 September 1992,
p. A1. See also Daniel A. Gibran, Absentee
Voting: A Brief History of Suffrage Expansion in
the United States (Washington, D.C.: Federal
Voting Assistance Program, August 2001).
75. Ole R. Holsti, “A Widening Gap between the
U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evi-
dence, 1976–1996,” International Security,
Winter 1998/1999, p. 11; TISS survey data.
Some observers think the actual Republican
figure is much higher, many officers being re-
luctant to reveal a preference, “knowing full
and well what the reaction would be if the
percentage of Republicans in the elite military
ranks was seen to approach 85 to 90 per cent,
which I am told is a reasonable figure.” This
well-connected West Point graduate contin-
ued, “We’re in danger of developing our own
in-house Soviet-style military, one in which if
you’re not in ‘the party,’ you don’t get ahead.
I have spoken with several . . . who were run
out of the Army near the beginning of their
careers when commanders became aware that
they had voted for Clinton in 1992. I have no
doubt they are telling me the truth, and . . .
I’ve spoken with some . . . who confirm their
stories.” Enclosure in Tom Ricks to the au-
thor, 20 November 2000. Generals and admi-
rals—who, as older, more senior, and more
experienced officers could be expected to be
imbued with the more traditional ethic of
nonaffiliation—have a slightly higher inde-
pendent or nonpartisan self-identification. In
1984, Newsweek (9 July, p. 37) surveyed 257
flag officers, about a quarter of those on ac-
tive duty; the results were Republican 52 per-
cent, Democrat 4 percent, independent 43
percent, “don’t know” 1 percent. Holsti’s
1984 officer sample contained 29 percent in-
dependents. The TISS survey included seventy-
four one and two-star officers: Republican 57
percent; Democrat 9 percent; independent,
no preference, and other 34 percent. The
TISS active-duty sample was 28 percent inde-
pendent/no preference/other.
76. Pat Towell, “GOP Advertises Differences
with Commander in Chief in Military-
Oriented Papers,” Congressional Quarterly
Weekly, 11 December 1999, p. 2984; Repub-
lican National Committee advertisement,
“Keeping the Commitment: Republicans Re-
verse Years of Military Neglect,” Air Force
Times, 13 December 1999, p. 57; Republican
National Committee postcard to University
of North Carolina Army ROTC cadre mem-
bers, n.d. [fall 2000], in possession of au-
thor; Frank Abbott to author, 11 October
2000; David Wood, “Military Breaks Ranks
with Non-Partisan Tradition,” Cleveland
Plain Dealer, 22 October 2000, p. 16. Just
prior to the election, the Republican National
Committee paid for e-mail messages from
Colin Powell urging recipients to vote for
“our Republican team”; Powell to Alvin
Bernstein, subject “A Message from Colin L.
Powell,” 6 November 2000, in possession of
author. In the 2000 election, about 72 per-
cent of overseas military personnel, targeted
particularly by Republicans, voted. The
overall voting rate for the civilian popula-
tion was 50 percent. Robert Suro, “Pentagon
Will Revise Military Voting Procedures,”
Washington Post, 23 June 2001, p. 2. The
Bush campaign pushed to count overseas
military ballots, even questionable ones, in
K O H N 5 1
44
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 3, Art. 2
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss3/2
counties where Bush was strong and to dis-
qualify those in counties where Gore was
strong, nearly resulting in a large enough net
gain to swing the outcome by itself. David
Barstow and Don Van Natta, Jr., “How Bush
Took Florida: Mining the Overseas Absentee
Vote,” New York Times, 15 July 2001, p. 1.
77. Christopher McKee, A Gentlemanly and Hon-
orable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Na-
val Officer Corps, 1794–1815 (Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 107–8; Wil-
liam B. Skelton, An American Profession of
Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784–1861
(Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1992),
chap. 15; Edward M. Coffman, The Old
Army: A Portrait of the American Army in
Peacetime, 1784–1898 (New York: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 87–96, 242–3, 266–9;
Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The
Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of
Modern American Navalism (New York: Free
Press, 1972), pp. 203–13.
78. General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., in The Twi-
light of the U.S. Cavalry: Life in the Old Army,
1917–1942 (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas,
1989), remembers that “there was never
much partisan political feeling on military
posts, even during years of presidential elec-
tions. . . . [T]he military were isolated from
the political rivalries. . . . Then too, Regular
Army officers were sworn to uphold and de-
fend the Constitution . . . and . . . carried out
orders regardless of the political party in
power. . . . Further, few officers maintained
voting residence, and absentee voting was rel-
atively rare at this time” (p. 130). Edward M.
Coffman, who has spent over two decades
studying the peacetime Army (his volume
covering the social history of the Army,
1898–1941, to follow his The Old Army, is
near completion), found that regular officers
in the nineteenth century “generally stayed
out of politics with rare exceptions” and dur-
ing “the 20th century” had “virtually no par-
ticipation in voting. For one thing, the
absentee ballot was not in vogue—and then
there was the problem of establishing resi-
dency but, as I picked up in interviews
[Coffman has done several hundred with vet-
erans of the 1900–40 era], they didn’t think it
was their place to vote. Again and again, both
officers and their wives told me that they
didn’t vote until after retirement.” Coffman
e-mail to the author, 23 July 1999. Non-
partisanship and lack of voting in the 1930s is
confirmed by Daniel Blumenthal in “Legal
Prescriptions, Customary Restrictions, Insti-
tutional Traditions: The Political Attitudes of
American Officers Leading Up to World War
II,” seminar paper, National Security Law
Course, Duke University Law School, 4 April
1998.
79. I agree with Lance Betros, “Political Partisan-
ship and the Military Ethic in America,”
Armed Forces & Society, vol. 27, 2001,
pp. 501–23, that the mere act of voting is not
partisan, but I think that continual voting
over time for the same party can lead to parti-
sanship that does harm military professional-
ism. In a March 1999 discussion at the Naval
War College, Admiral Stanley Arthur felt that
officers who are sincere about their votes
“take ownership” of them, a commitment
that could undermine their ability to be neu-
tral, apolitical instruments of the state. I do
not find that promoting one’s armed service,
writing about national defense issues to affect
policy, and making alliances with politicians
to advance one’s own personal and service in-
terests are the same as the partisanship of
identifying personally with the ideology and
political and cultural agendas of a political
party, which is the kind of partisanship that
has emerged in the last two decades. For a
different view, see Betros, “Officer Profes-
sionalism in the Late Progressive Era,” in The
Future of Army Professionalism, ed. Don
Snider and Gayle Watkins (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 2002).
80. Mackubin Thomas Owens, “The Democratic
Party’s War on the Military,” Wall Street Jour-
nal, 22 November 2000, p. 22. See also Tom
Donnelly, “Why Soldiers Dislike Democrats,”
Weekly Standard, 4 December 2000, p. 14.
81. Ed Offley, “Rejected Military Votes Spark
New Furor in Florida Election Count,” Stars
and Stripes Omnimedia, 20 November 2000;
Thomas E. Ricks, “Democratic Ballot Chal-
lenges Anger Military,” Washington Post, 21
November 2000, p. A18; Kenneth Allard,
“Military Ballot Mischief,” Washington Times,
27 November 2000; Elaine M. Grossman,
“Rift over Florida Military Ballots Might Af-
fect a Gore Administration,” Inside the Penta-
gon, 30 November 2000, p. 1.
5 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
45
Kohn: Thr Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United Sta
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002
82. Triangle Institute for Security Studies, “Sur-
vey on the Military in the Post Cold War
Era,” 1999. The question read: “If civilian
leaders order the military to do something
that it opposes, military leaders will seek ways
to avoid carrying out the order: all of the time
[9 percent chose this answer]; most of the
time [21 percent]; some of the time [38 per-
cent]; rarely [20 percent]; never [8 percent];
no opinion [4 percent].” The telephone sur-
vey of over a thousand people was adminis-
tered by Princeton Survey Research
Associates in September 1998.
83. I made this argument more fully in “The Politi-
cal Trap for the Military,” Raleigh (North
Carolina) News & Observer, 22 September 2000,
p. A19, orig. pub. Washington Post, 19 Septem-
ber 2000, p. A23. See also Charles A. Stevenson,
“Bridging the Gap between Warriors and Politi-
cians,” paper presented at the annual meeting of
the American Political Science Association, At-
lanta, Georgia, 2–5 September 1999.
84. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York:
Random House, 1998), pp. 144–6, 361–2. An
indication of the bitterness that developed be-
tween Holbrooke and Admiral Leighton W.
Smith, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces
Southern Europe, who carried out the bomb-
ing on behalf of Nato’s governing body, is in
“Frontline: Give War a Chance,” WGBH Edu-
cational Foundation, 2000, aired 11 May 1999,
Public Broadcasting System. For a dispassion-
ate view of the misunderstanding between po-
litical and military officials, see “Summary,” in
Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective
Bombing, ed. Robert C. Owen [Col., USAF]
(Maxwell Air Force Base [hereafter AFB], Ala.:
Air Univ. Press, 2000), pp. 500–5.
85. Huntington, Soldier and the State, chaps. 2,
8–11, pp. 361–7; James L. Abrahamson,
America Arms for a New Century: The Making
of a Great Military Power (New York: Free
Press, 1981), pp. 138–47; Karsten, Naval Aris-
tocracy, 187–93.
86. In the TISS survey, the answers “agree
strongly” or “agree somewhat” were given to
the assertion, “The decline of traditional val-
ues is contributing to the breakdown of our
society,” according to the following distribu-
tion (“military” being defined as active-duty,
reserve on active duty, and National Guard
up-and-coming officers): military, 89 per
cent; civilian elite, 70 percent; mass public, 82
percent. For the statement “Through leading
by example, the military could help American
society become more moral” the figures were
military 70 percent and civilian elite 42 per-
cent (the mass public was not surveyed on
this question). For “Civilian society would be
better off if it adopted more of the military’s
values and customs,” the distribution was:
military, 75 percent; civilian elite, 29 percent;
and mass public, 37 percent. See also Davis,
“Attitudes and Opinions,” in Soldiers and Ci-
vilians, ed. Feaver and Kohn, pp. 116–9. For
more analysis of the military view of civilian
society, see Gronke and Feaver, “Uncertain
Confidence,” pp. 147ff. On p. 149 they write,
“Elite military officers evaluate civilian soci-
ety far more negatively than do elite civil-
ians.” The use of the military as a role model
for society has a long history in American
thinking; in the 1980s, the Chief of Naval Op-
erations, James D. Watkins, was a leading
proponent of that view. Peter Grier, “Navy as
National Role Model?” Christian Science
Monitor, 4 June 1986, p. 1.
87. Sam C. Sarkesian, “The U.S. Military Must
Find Its Voice,” Orbis, Summer 1998,
pp. 423–37; James H. Webb, Jr., “The Silence
of the Admirals,” U.S. Naval Institute Pro-
ceedings, January 1999, pp. 29–34. Sarkesian
expanded the argument in Sam C. Sarkesian
and Robert E. Connor, Jr., The U.S. Military
Profession into the Twenty-first Century: War,
Peace and Politics (London: Frank Cass,
1999), esp. chaps. 11, 12. Even as respected
and experienced a defense reporter as George
C. Wilson has implied that the senior military
leadership should speak out publicly in dis-
agreement with their civilian superiors. This
sentiment became something of a mantra in
the middle and late 1990s as senior officers
were accused of caving in to political correct-
ness. See Wilson, “Joint Chiefs Need to Be
More Gutsy,” National Journal, 20 November
1999, p. 3418.
88. Webb, “Silence of the Admirals,” p. 34.
89. Crowe, Line of Fire, p. 214. The 1998–99
TISS survey asked under what circumstances
“it is acceptable for a military member to
leak unclassified information or documents
to the press.” The figures for active-duty of-
ficers were (rounded up):
K O H N 5 3
46
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 3, Art. 2
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss3/2
Reserve and National Guard officers were
slightly more willing to agree to leak, but a
higher percentage of them (46 percent) an-
swered “never.”
90. Peter J. Skibitski, “New Commandant In-
tends to Push for More Resources for Penta-
gon,” Inside the Navy, 15 November 1999,
p. 1; Hunter Keeter, “Marine Commandant
Calls for Defense Spending Increase,” Defense
Daily, 16 August 2000, p. 6; John Robinson,
“Outgoing 6th Fleet Commander Warns Fleet
Size Is Too Small,” Defense Daily, 22 Septem-
ber 2000, p. 1; Elaine M. Grossman, “Defense
Budget Boost to 4 Percent of GDP Would
Pose Dramatic Shift,” Inside the Pentagon, 31
August 2000, p. 3; Steven Lee Myers, “A Call
to Put the Budget Surplus to Use for the Mili-
tary,” New York Times, 28 September 2000,
p. A24; Cindy Rupert, “Admiral: Navy Pales
to Past One,” Tampa Tribune, 21 October
2000, p. 2; Linda de France, “Senior Navy Of-
ficers: ‘We Need More Ships, Planes, Subs,’”
Aerospace Daily, 30 October 2000, and “In
Next QDR, ‘Budgets Need to Support Our
Tasking,’ General Says,” Aerospace Daily, 4 De-
cember 2000; Vickii Howell, “Admiral Tells
Civic Clubs Navy Needs More Ships, Subs,”
Birmingham (Alabama) News, 16 November
2000, p. 6B; Robert I. Natter, “Help Keep This
the Greatest Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute Pro-
ceedings, December 2000, p. 2; Rowan
Scarborough, “Military Expects Bush to Per-
form,” Washington Times, 26 December 2000,
p. 1.
91. Rowan Scarborough, “Cohen Tells Military
Leaders ‘Not to Beat Drum with Tin Cup,’”
Washington Times, 8 September 2000, p. 4.
Secretary Cohen told them, according to his
spokesman, “to be honest but. . . .” According
to Thomas E. Ricks and Robert Suro, “Mili-
tary Budget Maneuvers Target Next Presi-
dent,” Washington Post, 5 June 2000, p. 1, the
armed services began ignoring civilian orders
on the budget as early as June 2000, in order
to “target” the next administration. “‘We’re
going for the big money,’ an officer on the
Joint Staff was quoted as saying. . . . Pentagon
insiders say the Clinton administration,
which long has felt vulnerable on military is-
sues, doesn’t believe it can afford a public
feud with the chiefs—especially in the midst
of Gore’s campaign. So, these officials say,
aides to defense Secretary William S. Cohen
are seeking only to avoid confrontation and
to tamp down the controversy. . . . One career
bureaucrat in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense said privately that he was offended
by the arrogant tone service officials have
used in recent discussions. . . . By contrast, a
senior military official said the chiefs’ budget
demands represent a ‘repudiation of bank-
rupt thinking’ in both the White House and
Congress, which have asked the military to
conduct a growing number of missions
around the world in recent years without
paying the full bill.”
92. Bradley Graham, “Joint Chiefs Doubted Air
Strategy,” Washington Post, 5 April 1999,
p. A1. See also Kenneth R. Rizer [Maj.,
USAF], Military Resistance to Humanitarian
War in Kosovo and Beyond: An Ideological Ex-
planation, Air University Library, Fairchild
Paper (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Univ. Press,
2000), pp. 1–2, 7, 41–2.
93. The regular public promotion of service in-
terests by officers began when the Navy and
5 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Opinion
Agree
(%)
Disagree
(%)
No Opinion
(%)
“A crime has been committed and the chain
of command is not acting on it.”
26 70 4
“Doing so may prevent a policy that will
lead to unnecessary casualties.”
30 65 6
“Doing so discloses a course of action that
is morally or ethically wrong.”
28 65 7
“He or she is ordered to by a superior.” 17 76 7
“Doing so brings to light a military policy
or course of action that may lead to a disas-
ter for the country.”
39 55 6
“Never” 41 49 10
47
Kohn: Thr Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United Sta
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002
Army in the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries formed coherent understand-
ings of their own roles in national defense
and formal doctrines for war-fighting in their
respective domains of sea and land (and later
air). The institutionalization of service advice
on military subjects and public pronounce-
ments on national security affairs has circum-
scribed civilian control to a degree. Efforts to
limit the military’s public voice, beginning
perhaps in the first Wilson administration
(1913–17), have been episodic and often inef-
fective. See Allan R. Millett, The American
Political System and Civilian Control of the
Military: A Historical Perspective (Columbus:
Mershon Center of the Ohio State University,
1979), pp. 19, 27–30; Karsten, Naval Aristoc-
racy, pp. 301–13, 362–71; Abrahamson,
America Arms for a New Century, pp. 147–50;
Betros, “Officer Professionalism,” in press;
Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers,
pp. 68–9.
94. Published in New York by HarperCollins,
1997. The author was McMaster’s adviser at
the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill, 1992–96, for the seminar papers, mas-
ter’s thesis, and Ph.D. dissertation that re-
sulted in the book.
95. McMaster hints at such an interpretation
only by implying that the Army chief of staff,
Harold K. Johnson, might have been justified
in resigning (p. 318); by implying that the
chiefs should have “confront[ed] the presi-
dent with their objections to McNamara’s ap-
proach to the war” (p. 328); by stating that
“the president . . . expected the Chiefs to lie”
and “the flag officers should not have toler-
ated it” (p. 331); and by blaming the chiefs
for going along with a strategy they believed
would fail, and thus sharing the culpability
with their deceitful civilian superiors for los-
ing the war “in Washington, D.C., even be-
fore Americans assumed sole responsibility
for the fighting in 1965 and before they real-
ized the country was at war; indeed, even be-
fore the first American units were deployed”
(pp. 333–4). The interpretation of long
standing in military thinking since the Viet-
nam War is that the war lacked clear objec-
tives; that it was lost because a fallacious
strategy was imposed by deceitful politicians
who limited American power and
micromanaged military operations; and
because the American people, with no stake
in the war (in part because elites avoided ser-
vice), were biased against the American effort
by a hostile press. Rosemary Mariner, a re-
tired naval captain and pioneer naval aviator,
remembers “a certain litany to the Vietnam
War story” in “every ready room” and at ev-
ery “happy hour” from “flight training and
throughout subsequent tactical aviation as-
signments” (she was commissioned in 1973),
a “tribal lore that Robert S. McNamara was
the devil incarnate whom the Joint Chiefs ob-
viously didn’t have the balls to stand up to. . . .
Had the generals and admirals resigned in
protest or conducted some kind of a second
‘admiral’s revolt,’ the war would have either
been won or stopped.” Thus Mariner’s “ini-
tial reaction to McMaster’s book was that it
simply affirmed what had been viewed as
common wisdom.” Conversation with the
author, 13 April 2000, Durham, N.C.; e-mail
to the author, 14 May 2001. Indications of
the impact of Vietnam on officer thinking are
in George C. Herring, “Preparing Not to
Fight the Last War: The Impact of the Viet-
nam War on the U.S. Military,” in After Viet-
nam: Legacies of a Lost War, ed. Charles Neu
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press,
2000), pp. 73–7; David Howell Petraeus, “The
American Military and the Lessons of Viet-
nam: A Study of Military Influence and the
Use of Force in the Post-Vietnam Era” (Ph.D.
dissertation, Princeton University, Princeton,
New Jersey, 1987); and Frank Hoffman, Deci-
sive Force: The New American Way of War
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996).
96. Fogleman explained his motives in a 1997 in-
terview and specifically rejected the notion
that he resigned in protest. Kohn, ed., “Early
Retirement of Fogleman,” pp. 6–23, esp. p. 20.
97. While there is no tradition of resignation in
the American armed forces, it has happened,
and occasionally senior officers have consid-
ered or threatened it. In 1907, “Admiral
Willard H. Brownson resigned as chief of
the Bureau of Navigation after the president
[Theodore Roosevelt], over Brownson’s pro-
tests, appointed a surgeon rather than a line
officer to command a hospital ship.” Oyos,
“Roosevelt, Congress, and the Military,”
p. 325. George C. Marshall offered or inti-
mated resignation, or was reported to have
done so, at least a half-dozen times when
K O H N 5 5
48
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 3, Art. 2
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss3/2
chief of staff, but he claimed later to have
actually threatened it only once—and in
retrospect characterized his action as “repre-
hensible.” Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Mar-
shall: Ordeal and Hope (New York: Viking,
1966), pp. 461 n. 33, 97–103, 285–7, and
George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory,
1943–1945 (New York: Viking, 1973),
pp. 246–7, 492–3, 510–1. General Harold K.
Johnson considered resigning several times,
and in August 1967 the Joint Chiefs (absent
one member) considered resigning as a
group over the Vietnam War. See Lewis
Sorley, Honorable Warrior: General Harold
K. Johnson and the Ethics of Command (Law-
rence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1998), pp.
181–2, 223–4, 263, 268–70, 285–7, 303–4. In
1977, on a flight to Omaha from Washing-
ton, General F. Michael Rogers suggested to
four of his colleagues that all of the Air
Force’s four-stars should resign over Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter’s cancelation of the B-1
bomber, but nothing came of the discussion.
See Erik Riker-Coleman, “Political Pressures
on the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Case of
General David C. Jones,” paper presented at
the annual meeting of the Society for Mili-
tary History, Calgary, Alberta, 27 May 2001.
The source for the discussion of mass resig-
nation is Bruce Holloway [Gen., USAF], oral
history interview by Vaughn H. Gallacher
[Lt. Col., USAF], 16–18 August 1977, pp.
424–6, U.S. Air Force Historical Research
Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. In a discus-
sion about pressure to resign over the
cancelation of the B-1, General David C.
Jones (oral history interview by Lt. Col.
Maurice N. Marynow, USAF, and Richard H.
Kohn, August–October 1985 and Janu-
ary–March 1986, pp. 178–9, 181) com-
mented, “I think there are cases where
people should perhaps resign: first, if they
are ever pressured to do something im-
moral, illegal, or unethical; second, if you
possibly felt you hadn’t had your day in
court—if you hadn’t been able to express
your views; or if we had been inhibited in
the conversation to the Congress. . . . It
seems to me that it is very presumptuous
that somebody in the military can set them-
selves up on a pedestal, that they have the
answer to the country, that the President
who has just been elected on a platform of
cutting the defense budget, is somehow so
wrong that we are in this pedestal position,
that we know the answers in this country. . . .
It is up to the military to make its case, and
then salute smartly once that case is made. . . .
The only thing I have seen while I was in the
military that really would be . . . a condition
of resignation would be somehow during
the Vietnam War. But probably . . . it would
have been for the wrong reasons[—] . . . the
White House . . . determining the targets . . .
or whatever. The more fundamental reason
is how in the world did we get ourselves in-
volved in a land war in Southeast Asia[?]. . .
[W]e are really servants of the people. The
people make their decisions on the Presi-
dent. We are not elected; the President is
elected. It’s only in that regard if number
one, they are trying to corrupt you by ignor-
ing you and by muzzling you and all that
sort of stuff. . . . Or if something is of such
national importance, and I’m not sure any-
body can predict it.” In 1980, General Ed-
ward N. Meyer, chief of staff of the Army,
was asked by the secretary of the Army to re-
scind a statement he had made to Congress
about “a hollow army.” Meyer refused and
offered his resignation, but it was not ac-
cepted. Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers, pp. 201–3.
Retired Marine Corps commandant Charles
C. Krulak (question and answer session,
Joint Services Conference on Professional
Ethics, Springfield, Virginia, 27–28 January
2000, enclosed in an e-mail from a colleague
to the author, 1 February 2000) claimed that
“it had become known within the Pentagon
that 56 Marine General Officers would ‘turn
in their suits’ if mixed gender training were
imposed on the Marine Corps. . . . The
Marines drew a line in the sand, and the op-
position folded.”
98. Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My
American Journey (New York: Random
House, 1995), p. 167.
99. Ibid., p. 149. In May 1983, then Lieutenant
Colonel Wesley Clark “suggested a line of
argument” to then Brigadier General Powell
for introducing a transition plan to the in-
coming Army chief of staff: “Isn’t the most
important thing never to commit U.S.
troops again unless we’re going in to win?
No more gradualism and holding back like
in Vietnam, but go in with overwhelming
force?” According to Clark, “Powell agreed. . . .
5 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
49
Kohn: Thr Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United Sta
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002
This argument captured what so many of us
felt after Vietnam.” Clark, Waging Modern
War, p. 7. Clark remembered that “in the
Army, it had long been an article of resolve
that there would be ‘no more Vietnams,’
wars in which soldiers carried the weight of
the nation’s war despite the lack of public
support at home” (p. 17).
100. Ole R. Holsti, “Of Chasms and Convergences:
Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military
Elites at the Start of a New Millennium,” in Sol-
diers and Civilians, ed. Feaver and Kohn, pp. 84,
489, and tables 1.27, 1.28.
101. Ronald T. Kadish [Lt. Gen., USAF], Direc-
tor, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization,
“Remarks,” 6 December 2000, Space and
Missile Defense Symposium and Exhibition,
Association of the United States Army, El
Paso, Texas, on the World Wide Web at
http://www.ausa.org/kadish.html (5 January
2000).
102. Frank Hoffman e-mail to the author, 14
March 2000. Hoffman, a member of the na-
tional security study group assisting the U.S.
Commission on National Security/21st Cen-
tury, reported his conversation with a “Joint
Staff Officer that the Joint Staff and the mili-
tary officers in the NSC were coordinating a
rapid schedule to preclude the president from
announcing a Clinton Doctrine on the use of
force in late October. It was expressed in the
conversation that it was hoped that publish-
ing a strategy with narrow use of force criteria
would cut out the president from contradict-
ing himself late in the month in a speech that
would contravene the military’s idea of how
to use military force.”
103. Kohn, ed., “Early Retirement of Fogleman,”
p. 12.
104. “Why is it . . . that whatever the question
is—enforcing a peace agreement in Bosnia,
evacuating the U.N. from Bosnia, or invading
Haiti, the answer is always 25,000 Army
troops?” asked one Marine officer of a re-
porter. By mid-1995, the uniformed leadership
was more divided on opposing interventions.
See Thomas E. Ricks, “Colin Powell’s Doctrine
on Use of Military Force Is Now Being Ques-
tioned by Senior U.S. Officers,” Wall Street
Journal, 30 August 1995, p. A12; Quinn-Judge,
“Doubts of Top Brass,” p. 12.
105. Kohn, ed., “Early Retirement of Fogleman,”
p. 18. Another possible resignation was
voiced privately in 2000. Conversation with a
senior military officer, January 2001.
106. In “The Pentagon, Not Congress or the Pres-
ident, Calls the Shots,” International Herald
Tribune, 6 August 2001, on the World Wide
Web at http://www.iht.com/articles/
28442.htm (5 December 2001), journalist
William Pfaff calls the military “the most
powerful institution in American govern-
ment, in practice largely unaccountable to
the executive branch.” He considers the
Pentagon’s “power in Congress” to be
“unassailable.” In “The Praetorian Guard,”
National Interest, Winter 2000/2001,
pp. 57–64, Pfaff asserts (p. 63) that Ameri-
can “military forces play a larger role in na-
tional life than their counterparts in any
state outside the Third World.” See also
Desch, Civilian Control, chap. 3 and appen-
dix; Charles Lane, “TRB from Washington,”
New Republic, 15 November 1999, p. 8;
Melvin Goodman, “Shotgun Diplomacy: The
Dangers of Letting the Military Control For-
eign Policy,” Washington Monthly, December
2000, pp. 46–51; Gore Vidal, “Washington,
We Have a Problem,” Vanity Fair, December
2000, pp. 136ff.
107. For the long-term congressional forfeiture of
authority in national security, see Louis
Fisher, Congressional Abdication on War &
Spending (College Station: Texas A&M Univ.
Press, 2000), chaps. 1–4.
108. The oath every American military officer
takes upon commissioning reads: “I, [name],
do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will sup-
port and defend the Constitution of the
United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic; that I will bear true faith and alle-
giance to the same; that I take this obligation
freely, without any mental reservation or pur-
pose of evasion; and that I will well and faith-
fully discharge the duties of the office on
which I am about to enter. So help me God.”
The requirement and wording is in 5 U.S.C.
§3331 (1966). An oath to support the Consti-
tution is required of “all executive and judi-
cial officers” as well as senators and
representatives, of the national and state gov-
ernments, by Article VI, para. 3.
109. For civilian control in the Constitution, see
Richard H. Kohn, “The Constitution and
K O H N 5 7
50
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 3, Art. 2
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss3/2
National Security: The Intent of the
Framers,” in The United States Military under
the Constitution of the United States,
1789-1989, ed. Richard H. Kohn (New York:
New York Univ. Press, 1991), pp. 61–94.
110. This is George Bush’s characterization, in “A
Nation Blessed,” Naval War College Review,
Autumn 2001, p. 138. The actual civil-military
relationship and the extent of civilian over-
sight are revealed in the works cited in
endnote 111, below.
111. A good bibliography of the literature on the
Vietnam War is George C. Herring, Amer-
ica’s Longest War: The United States and
Vietnam, 1950–1975, 3d ed. (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1996). The most convincing
explanations of the American defeat explore
the inability of the United States and South
Vietnam to prevent communist forces from
contesting the countryside and thereby con-
tinuing combat, and the failure to establish
an indigenous government that could com-
mand the loyalty or obedience of the popu-
lation, in the crucial period 1965–68, before
the American people lost patience with the
cost and inconclusiveness of the struggle and
forced American disengagement. The best
discussion to date of civil-military relations
in the Persian Gulf War is Michael R.
Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor,
The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the
Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown,
1995). The memoirs of Generals Powell and
Schwarzkopf confirm the very strong over-
sight and occasional intervention by the
Bush administration in strategy and opera-
tions during the fighting. The senior British
commander in the Gulf, General Sir Peter de
la Billiere, Storm Command: A Personal Ac-
count (London: HarperCollins, 1992), re-
members (p. 103) that “Schwarzkopf was
under intense pressure from Washington . . .
to consider other plans being dreamt up
by amateur strategists in the Pentagon,”
but (pp. 139–40) that as late as early De-
cember 1990 he “had no written directive
as to how he should proceed[,] . . . no pre-
cise instructions as to whether he was to at-
tack Iraq as a whole, march on Baghdad,
capture Saddam, or what.” See also George
Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Trans-
formed (New York: Random House, 1998),
pp. 302ff.
112. That civilian control includes the right of the
civilians to be “wrong” is the insight of Peter
D. Feaver. See his “The Civil-Military
Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and
the Question of Civilian Control,” Armed
Forces & Society, vol. 23, 1996, p. 154.
113. The importance of firm civilian control, even
to the point of interference in technical mili-
tary matters, in order to assure a strong con-
nection between ends and means, is the
argument of Eliot A. Cohen, “The Unequal
Dialogue,” in Soldiers and Civilians, ed.
Feaver and Kohn, chap. 12.
114. S. L. A. Marshall, the famous journalist and
reserve officer who from the 1930s through
the 1970s studied and wrote so influentially
about soldiers, soldiering, battle, and war,
was not contrasting the military from other
professions but people in uniform from all
others when he wrote: “The placing of the
line of duty above the line of self interest . . .
is all that distinguishes the soldier from the
civilian. And if that aspect of military educa-
tion is slighted for any reason, the nation has
lost its main hold on security.” The Soldier’s
Load and the Mobility of a Nation (1947; repr.
Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Association,
1980), p. 104.
115. I am indebted to University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill emeritus professor of political
science Raymond Dawson for this
distinction.
116. Since the end of the Cold War, the Depart-
ment of Defense has created at least three
new institutes for security studies to teach
democratic defense practices, particularly ci-
vilian control of the military, to other na-
tions. Presently there are at least four, meant
to serve uniformed officers, defense officials,
and political leaders from formerly commu-
nist countries in Europe and Central Asia,
Latin America, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific
region.
117. Larry Rohter, “Fear of Loss of Democracy Led
Neighbors to Aid Return,” New York Times,
15 April 2002, p. A6; Christopher Marquis,
“Bush Officials Met with Venezuelans Who
Ousted Leader,” New York Times, 16 April
2002, pp. A1, A8; and Peter Hakim, “Democ-
racy and U.S. Credibility,” New York Times,
21 April 2002, p. 4 wk.
5 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
51
Kohn: Thr Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United Sta
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002
118.Speech to the House of Commons, 11 No-
vember 1947, quoted in Robert Rhodes
James, ed., Winston S. Churchill: His Complete
Speeches, 8 vols. (New York: Chelsea House,
1974), vol. 7, p. 7566.
K O H N 5 9
52
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 3, Art. 2
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss3/2
